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Prostitution will always lead into a moral quagmire in democratic 
societies with capitalist economies; it invades the terrain of intimate 
sexual relations yet beckons for regulation.  A society’s response to 
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prostitution goes to the core of how it chooses between the rights of some 
persons and the protection of others.↓ 
ABSTRACT 
The 1963 decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in Carroll v. Beardon 
occupies less than three full pages in the Pacific Reporter and involves a simple real 
estate transaction in which a “madam” sold a house used for prostitution to another 
“madam.”  The opinion is the last in a long line of cases which speak specifically to 
the issue of enforcement of facially legitimate contracts that in some manner involve 
or are related to prostitution.  It is commonly cited in treatises and hornbooks as 
representative of the movement by courts toward enforcement of such contracts 
under the law of improper use—scenarios in which the transaction itself is not 
illegal, but the underlying purpose or conduct of one or more parties to the 
transaction involves using the subject matter in an illegal manner.  It is unfortunate 
that this opinion appears in only a handful of casebooks and its subject matter has 
received so little scholarly attention because it provides both scholars and educators 
endless opportunities for exploration of the cultural context within which courts 
operate and construct case narratives.  Its humorous tone and deceptive simplicity 
also belie a serious failure by the court to provide a fair and impartial resolution of 
the parties’ dispute, to identify and balance the competing policy interests, and to 
create useful precedent for future courts and litigants.  Most importantly, this 1963 
decision and its implications remain relevant and merit consideration by scholars 
exploring the intersection of contract and criminal laws related to intimate sexual 
relationships.   
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Carroll v. Beardon,1 a case familiar to some first-year law students,2 occupies 
less than three full pages in the Pacific Reporter.3  Its brevity; its simple, 
                                                          
↓
   BARBARA MEIL HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE: THE POLITICS OF PROSTITUTION AND THE 
AMERICAN REFORM TRADITION 3 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990). 
 
 
1
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1963).  
 
2
 The case appears in the following textbooks: GERALD E. BERENDT ET AL., CONTRACT 
LAW AND PRACTICE 420-22 (2d ed. 2009); 1 STEWART MACAULAY ET AL., CONTRACTS: LAW IN 
ACTION, THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE 494-496 (3d ed. 2010).  It also appears to be fairly well 
known by law professors, perhaps even achieving a sort of cult status as an incorrectly 
decided, albeit interesting, decision.  See, e.g., D.A. Jeremy Telman, Langdellian Limericks, 
VAL. U. SCH. L. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, no. 10-09, Sept. 2010, at 27, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1681490 (creating a limerick for the case).  The limerick reads: 
In Montana arose a dispute 
O'er a house of doubtful repute. 
The seller madame, 
Not in on the scam 
May partake of her share of the loot. 
Id.  
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uncomplicated subject matter—a real estate transaction; its unsophisticated 
participants—a “madam” who transferred her ownership in a house used for 
prostitution to another “madam”;4 and the court’s simultaneously playful and 
sarcastic tone, combine to render this opinion an entertaining diversion for first-year 
law students from the dry, complicated fact patterns frequently found in contract law 
casebooks.5  This simple fact pattern and sarcastic opinion, however, may have 
caused both casebook authors and scholars to overlook it and its underlying public 
policy defense to contract enforcement,6 as a worthy subject of scholarly and 
educational attention.7  It is certainly understandable that in an area of law 
increasingly dominated by a shift from a judicial declaration of public policy to a 
search for and deference to legislative statements of public policy,8 that educators 
                                                          
 
3
 See Carroll, 381 P.2d at 295-97.  The case word count is a mere 1,474 words (using the 
Microsoft Word Count tool). 
 
4
 Id. at 295-96 
 
5
 Michael Hunter Schwartz, Teaching Law By Design: How Learning Theory and 
Instructional Design Can Inform and Reform Law Teaching, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 347, 368 
(2001) (arguing that “casebooks for first-year law students often start with incredibly difficult 
cases . . .  [addressing such topics as] expectation, reliance, and restitution.”).  
 
6
 Courts and parties frequently assert that contracts in violation of public policy are 
illegal.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1 (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter FARNSWORTH 
4th ed.).   
This is misleading insofar as it suggests that some penalty is necessarily imposed on 
one of the parties, apart from the court’s refusal to enforce the agreement.  In some 
cases, the conduct that renders the agreement unenforceable is also a crime, but this is 
not necessarily or even usually so.  It is therefore preferable to attribute 
unenforceability to grounds of public policy rather than to “illegality.” 
Id. at 315.  This misleading label is reflected in the First Restatement, which defined an 
agreement as illegal “if either its formation or its performance is criminal, tortious, or 
otherwise opposed to public policy.”  RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932).  “The 
Restatement (Second) avoids the term ‘illegal’ and subsumes all such unenforceable bargains 
under the amorphous but ubiquitous concept of ‘public policy.’”  JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 22.1, at 729 (6th ed. 2009).  See also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981).  In conformity with the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts terminology, this article will use the phrase “public policy” 
to also encompass contracts that are truly illegal.  For examples of these truly illegal contracts, 
see infra note 139.   
 
7
 See Adam B. Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 483, 488 (2010) (commenting that “[d]espite the frequency with which 
courts analyze illegal contracts, commentary on this issue has been sparse.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
 
8
 “The declaration of public policy has now become largely the province of legislators 
rather than judges.  This is in part because legislators are supported by facilities for factual 
investigations and can be more responsive to the general public.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 179 cmt. b (1981).  Typically, legislation is silent as to whether contracts are 
enforceable.  Id.  In these circumstances, a court will find a contract unenforceable “on the 
basis of a public policy derived either from its own perception of the need to protect some 
aspect of the public welfare or from legislation that is relevant to that policy although it says 
nothing explicitly about unenforceability.”  Id. § 178 cmt. b.   
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and scholars would focus their attention on cases involving, for example, surrogacy9 
or prenuptial agreements,10 over this somewhat dated decision.11     
It would also be an overstatement to analogize the historical perspective provided 
by a case such as Carroll v. Beardon to that, for example, of Webb v. McGowan12 
                                                          
 
9
 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE 22-39 (4th ed. 2008); 
LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 107-09 (8th ed. 2006); 
IAN AYERS & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 645-48 (7th ed. 2008); JOHN P. 
DAWSON ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 583-91 (9th ed. 2008); E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 575-82 (7th ed. 2008) (hereinafter 
FARNSWORTH 7th ed.); CHARLES L. KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 647-58 (6th ed. 2007); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 535-52 (2010). 
 
10
 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH 7th ed., supra note 9, at 571-75; ARTHUR ROSETT & DANIEL J. 
BUSSEL, CONTRACT LAW AND ITS APPLICATION 289-307 (7th ed. 2007).  Other contemporary 
cases found in textbooks include those involving post-employment restrictive covenants.  See, 
e.g., BRIAN A. BLUM & AMY C. BUSHAW, CONTRACTS: CASES, DISCUSSION, AND PROBLEMS 
492-95 (2d ed. 2008); BRUCE W. FRIER & JAMES J. WHITE, THE MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS 
430-41 (2d ed. 2008); JAMES F. HOGG ET AL., CONTRACTS: CASES AND THEORY OF 
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 518-23 (2008); KNAPP, supra note 9, at 633-47; ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION: THEORY, DOCTRINE, 
AND PRACTICE 568-71 (5th ed. 2006).  These cases are chosen for their strong competing 
policy interests, which have shifted over time as cultural and, accordingly, judicial views on 
the employment relationship have shifted.  FARNSWORTH 4th ed., supra note 6, § 5.3.  One 
commentator explained this tension in competing public policy interests in the context of 
restrictive employment covenants as follows: “[n]owhere has judicial activism in the service 
of public policy been more at war with judicial laissez faire in the name of freedom of 
contract.”  Id. at 323.  The historical policy basis for denying enforcement of such covenants 
was based upon  
the risk of depriving individual employees of their ability to earn a living.  During the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, courts sought to protect apprentices, who purchased 
their training and license to trade through the guild system, by preventing masters 
from extending the requisite period of servitude through the use of restrictive 
covenants.  The dominance of the apprenticeship system as a means of entering a 
trade combined with the relative difficulty of traveling outside one’s town or village 
made even narrow geographic limitations on postemployment competition particularly 
onerous.  Thus, the earliest recorded cases voided such agreements as unfair restraints 
of trade.  
Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration 
of the Role of Substantive Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 OR. L. REV. 
1163, 1171 (2001) (footnotes omitted).  Blanket invalidity was replaced by “a more tempered 
approach by the early part of the eighteenth century.”  Id.  The modern approach to these 
covenants is premised upon three considerations: “the possible loss to the promisor of his or 
her means of earning a living, the danger of corporate monopolization, and the potential loss 
to society of the services of one of its members.”  Id.     
 
11
 The Supreme Court of Montana issued its decision on May 9, 1963.  Carroll v. Beardon, 
381 P.2d 295, 295 (Mont. 1963).  For the precise date that the relevant contract was entered 
into in this case, see infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 
12
 Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935) (holding severely injured 
employee saved employer’s life and employer’s subsequent promise to compensate employee 
was enforceable).  The problems encountered in this area of case law commonly fall under the 
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and Mills v. Wyman13 in the area of promissory restitution.14  Carroll v. Beardon, 
however, holds its own in establishing a context for both student and scholarly 
exploration of the problems with the tests devised by the courts in this area of law 
and, for that matter, in any area in which public policy dominates the analysis.15  In 
fact, this 1963 judicial opinion, which is the most recent opinion to address contracts 
involving prostitution and the improper use defense—scenarios in which the 
transaction itself is not illegal, but the underlying purpose or conduct of one or more 
parties to the transaction involves using the subject matter in an illegal manner—is 
routinely cited in both treatises and hornbooks as representative of the movement by 
courts toward enforcement of such contracts.16 
It also provides endless teaching and scholarly opportunities for examination of 
this rich resource and vivid illustration of the importance of cultural context to legal 
analysis.17  Because the murky line-drawing inherent in public policy analysis18 is 
                                                          
labels “past consideration” or  “moral obligation” because a strict reading of the promise 
reveals that it is not supported by consideration, given the fact that the other party's actions, 
which were undertaken prior to the making of the promise, could not have induced the 
promise.  Stanley D. Henderson, Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust 
Enrichment and the Law of Contracts, 57 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (1971).   
 
13
 Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (Mass. 1825) (holding father’s subsequent 
promise to Good Samaritan to compensate for care of ill son unenforceable as moral, but not 
legal, obligation). 
 
14
 The theory of promissory restitution does not appear in the Restatement of Contracts 
and was recognized for the first time in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86 (1981).  Pursuant to this doctrine, “courts are actually granting 
the plaintiff restitution for provision of services or goods in the past.  Courts emphasize the 
defendant's later promise, not because it ‘waives’ a technical defense or because it is binding 
in and of itself, but because it negates the traditional presumption that the services rendered 
were gratuitous.”  Geoffrey R. Watson, In the Tribunal of Conscience: Mills v. Wyman 
Reconsidered, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1749, 1793 (1997).  Webb v. McGowan is cited as an 
illustration to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§ 86 cmt. d, illus. 7.  Mills v. Wyman is cited as a contrasting situation in which a promise 
should not be held enforceable.  Id. at cmt. a, illus. 1.  
 
15
 See Kerry L. Macintosh, Am I My Borrower’s Keeper?, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1197, 1203 
(1989) (commenting in the context of the improper use doctrine and public policy that “few 
courts have identified the relevant policy considerations and still fewer have explained how or 
why the traditional rules further those policies”). 
 
16
 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH 4th ed., supra note 6, § 5.6 n.27.  The case is cited in all prior 
editions of this treatise.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.6 n.27 (3rd ed. 1999); E. 
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.6 n.27 (2d ed. 1990); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
CONTRACTS § 5.6 n.26 (1982).  Other contemporary treatises and hornbooks citing the case 
include: PERILLO, supra note 6, § 22.2; RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 
19.13 n.15, 19.69 n.62 (1998).   
 
17
 For purposes of this discussion, culture is defined as “any set of shared, signifying 
practices . . . by which meaning is produced, performed, contested, or transformed. . . . 
[C]ulture is ‘a process, not a conclusion,’ . . . of making, reproducing, and contesting 
meaning.”  Naomy Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 35, 42 & n.29 (2001) 
(quoting RAYMOND WILLIAMS, CULTURE AND SOCIETY 1780-1950, at 295 (1958)).  In fact, 
“law is so deeply embedded in the particularities of each culture that carving it out as a 
separate domain and only later making note of its cultural connections distorts the nature of 
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front and center in this decision to reject a line of older authority deeming such 
contracts unenforceable when the seller has only knowledge of the buyer’s intended 
illegal use,19 the case serves as evidence of the court’s role as a powerful institutional 
actor simultaneously influenced by and exerting influence upon the larger, social, 
political, economic, and legal culture within which it operates.20    
This overt focus on public policy analysis additionally challenges both the 
student reader and the scholar to focus on the very process of the legal analysis 
employed by the court and the malleable standards and tests it invoked to justify the 
result it reached.21  In this way, the case also serves as a vivid example of an 
                                                          
both law and culture.”  LAWRENCE ROSEN, LAW AS CULTURE: AN INVITATION xii (2006).  See 
also OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYSTEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL 
CONTEXT 2 (2005) (describing cultural differences in dispute processes as being largely “a 
reflection of the culture in which they are embedded”).   
 
18
 See, e.g., Janine Campanaro, Note, Until Death Do Us Part? Why Courts Should 
Expand Prenuptial Agreements to Include Ten-Year Marriages, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 583, 590 
(2010).  In explaining the public policy analysis underlying enforceability of prenuptial 
agreements, the author stated: 
As one judge sitting in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia stated when asked to 
determine if a prenuptial agreement was void as against public policy, “[t]he meaning 
of the phrase ‘public policy’ is vague and variable; courts have not exactly defined it, 
and there is no fixed rule by which to determine what contracts are repugnant to it. . . .  
The very reverse of that which is public policy at one time may become public policy 
at another time.  Hence, no fixed rules can be given by which to determine what is 
public policy. 
Id. (quoting Wallihan v. Hughes, 82 S.E.2d 553, 558 (Va. Ct. App. 1954)). 
 
19
 These decisions are generally premised on the view that unless the buyer’s intended 
illegal use threatens “grave social harm” or unless the seller actively participates in the 
buyer’s illegal use of the subject matter of the contract, the policies in favor of contract 
enforcement—the public interest in protecting the parties’ reasonable expectations, problems 
with resulting forfeiture due to reliance, and a party’s “excusable ignorance” of the public 
policy violations—outweigh countervailing policy interests.  FARNSWORTH 4th ed., supra note 
6, § 5.1, at 313-14, § 5.6, at 342.  For a detailed discussion of the relevant public policy 
interests, see infra notes 106-118, 135-153 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the 
application of the active participation test in the context of contracts involving prostitution, 
see infra notes 154-196 and accompanying text.     
 
20
 Law is “one (albeit very powerful) institutional cultural actor whose diverse agents 
(legislators, judges, civil servants, citizens) order and reorder meanings.”  Mezey, supra note 
17, at 45.  
[S]ocial practices are not logically separable from the laws that shape them and . . . if 
one were to talk about the relationship between culture and law, it would certainly be 
right to say that it is always dynamic, interactive, and dialectical—law is both a 
producer of culture and an object of culture.  Put generally, law shapes individual and 
group identity, social practices as well as the meaning of cultural symbols, but all of 
these things (culture in its myriad manifestations) also shape law by changing what is 
socially desirable, politically feasible, legally legitimate.  
Id. at 46.   
 
21
 Laurie Morin & Louise Howells, The Reflective Judgment Project, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 
623, 666 (2003) (describing entering law students' expectations that they will “memorize a 
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appellate court’s use of humor and its unique power to construct facts and to create 
one story of a given case, complete with factual compression, over-simplification, 
and distortion.22  Because culture is so intricately connected to this entire area of 
public policy defenses to contract enforcement, and because the judiciary has failed 
to articulate a coherent or viable approach to this specific line of cases involving the 
intersection of contract and criminal laws related to intimate sexual relationships, it 
is both surprising and disappointing that so little scholarly attention has been devoted 
to this area of law.23    
In order to provide a context for the discussion of the policy and legal issues, Part 
II of this article will present the facts of Carroll v. Beardon first as constructed by 
the trial court24 and then by the Supreme Court of Montana.25  These latter facts will 
then be analyzed along with facts from the record the court failed to mention, which 
demonstrate that the Supreme Court of Montana, contrary to its holding, should have 
found the contract unenforceable.26  Finally, Part II will also assess the effect the 
                                                          
body of rules that comprise the sum total of what they need to know about the law . . . They 
expect that there is a rule of law to fit any situation, so they search for direct fit analogs in 
black letter law.”).   
 
22
 Gerald Caplan, Legal Autopsies: Assessing the Performance of Judges and Lawyers 
Through the Window of Leading Contract Cases, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1, 7-10 (2009) (arguing that 
appellate court’s use of “[f]act selection” and compression in writing narratives “is a powerful 
discretionary tool that can be employed without detection to eliminate or obscure facts that 
might make the reader uncomfortable with the outcome”).  The different points of view or 
stories of the participants in the litigation process have been explored in a number of texts.  
See generally RICHARD DANZIG & GEOFFREY R. WATSON, THE CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN 
CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES (2d ed. 2004); CONTRACTS 
STORIES (Douglas Baird ed., 2007).  Neither of these texts includes a case involving the public 
policy defense to contract enforcement.  The earlier edition of the Danzig text did contain 
analysis of Karpinski v. Collins, 252 Cal. App. 2d 711 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), a case in which 
the appellate court affirmed a trial court's finding that the parties were not in pari delicto 
regarding a loan agreement, which included “secret rebates.”  RICHARD DANZIG, THE 
CAPABILITY PROBLEM IN CONTRACT LAW: FURTHER READINGS ON WELL-KNOWN CASES 129-
147 (1978). 
 
23
 See Badawi, supra note 7, at 488.    
 
24
 See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text. 
 
25
 See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
 
26
 See infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.  The parties, their attorneys, and the 
judges and justices have all passed away and, therefore, could not be interviewed about the 
case.  As to the parties, a public records search in the Social Security Death Index on Lexis 
and a search of records using www.archives.com revealed that a woman named Agnes 
Beardon died in Pierce County, Washington on May 25, 1998 at the age of 91.  There are 
numerous death records for Edna Carroll—an Edna Carroll died in Billings, Montana in June, 
1976 at the age of 89.  Two women named Edna Carroll died in Oregon, one in Marion 
County in September 1985 at the age of 88 and another in Multnomah County in June 1974, at 
the age of 83.  Ms. Carroll indicated in her deposition that she was living in Portland, Oregon 
at the time of her deposition, and given the fact that it is located in Multnomah County, this 
latter record may, in fact, be her death record.  See Transcript, infra note 35, at 72.  See also 
Oregon County Map with Administrative Cities, http://geology.com/county-
map/oregon.shtml.  In any event, Ms. Carroll indicated in her deposition, which was taken on 
September 1, 1961, that she was “getting along in years.”  Transcript, infra note 35, at 71, 94.  
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Supreme Court of Montana's use of humor has on the reader and the role culture may 
have played in shaping the court's cavalier and dismissive attitude toward the 
litigants, their attorneys, and the public policy issues.27  Part III will introduce the 
competing public policy interests generally found relevant to the improper use 
defense and specifically implicated in the case of Carroll v. Beardon, both of which 
also weigh against contract enforcement.28  Part IV of this article will assess the 
precedent that, although available to the Supreme Court of Montana, was essentially 
ignored; it will further demonstrate how this precedent similarly supports the public 
policy defense in this case.29  Part V will present a brief epilogue to the Supreme 
Court of Montana's decision in Carroll v. Beardon,30 and will assess one alternative 
approach the court could have taken to achieve a more accurate, honest resolution of 
the case31 and to provide valuable precedent to future courts grappling with current 
public policy issues related to the competing interests implicated by contract 
enforcement and the regulation of sexual relationships in this country.32 
II.  CARROLL V. BEARDON—THE NARRATIVE CONSTRUCTED BY THE COURTS AND THE 
ATTORNEYS 
Carroll v. Beardon is an excellent vehicle to begin exploration of the varied and 
frequently complex situations in which public policy defenses to contract 
enforcement arise.33  First, unlike many such cases,34 the facts as set forth in the trial 
                                                          
As such, it is extremely unlikely that either she or Ms. Beardon would be alive fifty years 
later.  As to the judges, a public records search in the Social Security Death Index on Lexis 
and at www.archives.com revealed that the trial court judge, LeRoy L. McKinnon, died in 
1999.  A similar search revealed that the five justices of the Supreme Court of Montana who 
heard Ms. Beardon’s appeal have died—Chief Justice James T. Harrison died in 1982, Justice 
John C. Harrison died in 2004, Justice Hugh Adair died in 1971, Justice Thomas Castles died 
in 1981, and Justice Stanley Doyle died in 1975.  A similar search revealed that one of Ms. 
Beardon's attorneys, John Bayuk, died in 1981.  The same search revealed that Ms. Beardon’s 
other attorney, Patrick Donovan, died in 1970.  The attorney who represented Ms. Carroll 
beginning early in the proceedings, after the complaint and answer were filed, and continuing 
through to the final appeal, John C. Hoyt, died in 2001.  Prior to his death, one of Ms. 
Carroll’s attorneys was asked about the case and responded in a letter: “as far as I was 
concerned, this was purely a business transaction between two persons who had made a deal 
for the sale of property.”  Macaulay, supra note 2, at 494.   
 
27
 See infra notes 48, 59-63, 69-75, 98 and accompanying text. 
 
28
 See infra notes 106-153 and accompanying text. 
 
29
 See infra notes 154-196 and accompanying text. 
 
30
 See infra notes 197-227 and accompanying text. 
 
31
 See infra notes 206-227 and accompanying text. 
 
32
 See infra notes 206-210, 221-227 and accompanying text. 
 
33
 As one author noted: 
[T]he underlying doctrine that courts will not enforce contracts that are against “public 
policy” encompasses . . . contracts ranging from promises to commit illegal acts to 
contracts in restraint of trade to indemnification provisions, to name a few.  The 
doctrine also contains notable exceptions, varying the level of enforcement depending 
on the particular circumstances.  In short, void for public policy doctrine is 
longstanding, but also rather confusing. 
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court decision and the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana appear 
undisputed and straightforward, initially revealing nothing more than a routine real 
estate transaction gone awry.  On March 15, 1960, Edna Carroll signed a warranty 
deed to sell a house, its contents, and fifty acres of land located in rural Montana 
along the northwest part of the state bordering Canada for fifty-thousand dollars.35  
On the same date, Agnes Beardon paid Ms. Carroll $8,000.00 as a down payment 
and signed a note and mortgage pursuant to which she agreed to pay a total amount 
of $42,000.00 to Ms. Carroll in $1,000.00 monthly mortgage payments for the first 
six months of the year followed by monthly payments of $2,000.00 for the 
remaining six months of the year.36  Ms. Beardon was in default from the beginning, 
making only one partial payment on August 5, 1960.37  The trial court’s narrative 
ended here with no mention of either party’s unlawful use of the premises or 
assessment of Ms. Beardon’s public policy defense and its corresponding narrative.38 
                                                          
Harvard Law Review Association, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts Against Public 
Policy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1445, 1445 (2006).  
 
34
 See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 368 & n.80. 
 
35
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 295 (Mont. 1963).  The mortgage was actually signed 
by Ms. Carroll on March 14, 1960.  Transcript of Record on Appeal at 1-5, Carroll v. 
Beardon, 381 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1963) (No. 10493) (hereinafter “Transcript”).  It was signed by 
Ms. Beardon and returned to Ms. Carroll on March 25, 1960.  Id. at 1.  The mortgage was 
filed in the Office of the Toole County Clerk and Recorder on April 18, 1960.  Id. at Exhibit 
B.  From the outset, the Supreme Court of Montana oversimplified the facts, omitting mention 
of a third deposition that was submitted to the trial court, the deposition of Ms. Carroll’s, and 
later Ms. Beardon’s, housekeeper.  Id. at 95-101.  The court stated only that the “matter was 
submitted to the district court on depositions of the parties involved.”  Carroll, 381 P.2d at 
295.  The statement is misleading, implying that only the parties provided deposition 
testimony.  For a discussion of the housekeeper’s testimony and its relevance to the issues 
presented in the case, see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
 
36
 Carroll, 381 P.2d at 295; Transcript, supra note 35, at 1-5.  For purposes of clarity, it 
should be noted that there were actually two contracts entered into by the parties in this case.  
In the first contract, Ms. Carroll sold the property to Ms. Beardon.  In the second contract, Ms. 
Carroll was the lender and Ms. Beardon was the borrower.  The lawsuit filed by Ms. Carroll 
against Ms. Beardon, involving a mortgage foreclosure action, was based upon the second 
contract.  For purposes of this article, however, the parties will either be referred to by their 
surnames or as seller and buyer rather than as lender and borrower.  
 
37
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 66.  According to the terms of the contract, and to Ms. 
Carroll's deposition testimony, the first payment of $1,000.00 was due in May 1960 and was 
not paid.  Id. at 1-5, 89-90.  According to the terms of the contract, $2,000.00 was due in 
August, Ms. Beardon only paid $1,000.00, and she also failed to pay the amounts due in June 
and July of 1960.  Id. at 1-5. 
 
38
 Although the original judge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit, W.M. Black, denied Ms. 
Carroll’s demurrer to Ms. Beardon’s public policy defense, Transcript, supra note 35, at 15-
16, and appeared willing to hear the defense, his replacement, Judge McKinnon of the Tenth 
Judicial District, never addressed the defense in his written Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law.  Id. at 24-29.  For a discussion of the reasons for Judge Black’s disqualification in this 
case, see infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.  
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The additional facts supplied in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Montana are also uncontroverted.39  Ms. Beardon admitted in her answer to the 
complaint and in her deposition that her sole use of the property was to facilitate 
prostitution, and that when she purchased the property from Ms. Carroll in 1960, the 
property was commonly known as a house of prostitution and was referred to in the 
local community as the “Hillside Ranch.”40  This common knowledge apparently 
extended to the federal government.  Federal tax records were issued in 1961 by the 
Internal Revenue Service to Ms. “Edna B. Carroll” at the “Hillside Ranch.”41  Ms. 
Carroll’s reluctant admission in her deposition corroborates these records and the 
fact that this use of the property to facilitate prostitution began when she purchased 
the property in 1956 and continued until she sold it to Ms. Beardon four years later.42  
                                                          
 
39
 Carroll, 381 P.2d at 295-96.  The Supreme Court of Montana was bound by the trial 
court’s findings of fact, but apparently concluded that the additional facts were consistent with 
the lower court’s conclusions of law that the contract was enforceable.  See Baker Nat’l Bank 
v. Lestar, 453 P.2d 774, 779 (Mont. 1969) (“Although [the Supreme Court of Montana] is 
bound to review the evidence as will [sic] as the law, the review is limited to determining 
whether there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether 
such findings are sufficient to support the conclusions of law based thereon.”); Morrison v. 
City of Butte, 431 P.2d 79, 82 (Mont. 1967) (“Where facts are found by the trial court sitting 
without a jury [the Supreme Court of Montana] is bound by such findings of fact unless they 
are clearly contrary to the evidence”).  Even though the trial court did not explicitly address 
the public policy defense, the Supreme Court of Montana found “ample evidence in the record 
to sustain the trial court’s findings and conclusions.”  Carroll, 381 P.2d at 297.  Because the 
trial court did not mention Ms. Beardon’s public policy defense, its decision should have been 
reversed and remanded.  See infra note 206. 
 
40
 Carroll, 381 P.2d at 296.  See infra note 81.  See also Transcript, supra note 35, at 34, 
55, 65, 68.  Ms. Beardon also testified that she charged $15.00 per day for room and board and 
provided meals to the women living at the Hillside Ranch.  Id. at 61.   
 
41
 Id. at 71-94, Exhibit No. 1. 
 
42
 Id. at 76-82.  The following excerpt from Ms. Carroll's deposition reveals her 
reluctance: 
Ms. Beardon’s attorney: “Did you intend at the time 
that this property was sold and subject to mortgage 
that it would be operated as a house of prostitution?”   
Ms. Carroll’s response:  “No.”   
Ms. Beardon’s attorney: “Had it ever been operated as 
a house of prostitution?”  
Ms. Carroll’s response:  “Yes.”  
Ms. Beardon’s attorney: “And by whom?”   
Ms. Carroll’s response: “By myself.”   
Ms. Beardon’s attorney: “And when was the last date, 
if any, that you recall when it was so operated?” 
Ms. Carroll’s response: “March 15th.” 
Id. at 75-76.      
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These seemingly simple and straightforward facts stand in sharp contrast to the 
closely competing public policy interests that are implicated when criminal laws 
exercising police powers are in tension with the private autonomous system of 
contract law.43  For this reason alone, the improper use defense as presented in cases 
such as Carroll v. Beardon provides an optimal pedagogical introduction to the 
public policy defense.44  Moreover, the relevant public policy interests include core 
principles and recurring themes,45 rendering the improper use defense a logical 
starting point and foundation for an exploration of the more contemporary cases 
involving, for example, identification of and deference to legislative public policy 
choices,46 or situations in which policy analysis has been replaced over time with 
established tests or standards.47 
                                                          
 
43
 Criminal laws rarely control the resolution of the contract defense, because when 
legislatures define a crime, they rarely speak to the enforcement of contracts that are in some 
way connected to the commission of the crime.  Harry G. Prince, Public Policy Limitations on 
Cohabitation Agreements: Unruly Horse or Circus Pony?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 163, 180 n.70 
(1985).  Judges must, therefore, identify the public policy interests served by the criminal law 
and determine whether enforcement of the contract will “disserve” the policy interests so 
identified.  Id.  See also Juliet P. Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A 
Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74 IOWA L. REV. 115, 122 (1988) (discussing argument that 
aspects of contract law reflect “expanding incursions of collectivist and paternalistic notions 
which have begun to undermine the essentially private world of traditional contract law”) 
(footnotes omitted).   
 
44
 For a discussion of the improper use doctrine as applied to the facts of Carroll v. 
Beardon, see infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. 
 
45
 One such policy interest implicated in the improper use context is protecting reasonable 
expectations.  See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.  The main purpose underlying 
“‘contract law is realization of reasonable expectations induced by promises.’”  Aaron 
Gershonowitz, The Strict Liability Duty to Warn, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 71, 79 n.50 (1987) 
(quoting 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 1).  See also Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and 
Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 821 (2006) (describing the “core principle” driving 
contract law as “the protection of reasonable expectations”).  Another important policy 
interest implicated with this public policy defense, individual liberty, has been described in the 
context of employment at will as follows:  
Freedom of contract is an aspect of individual liberty, every bit as much as freedom of 
speech, or freedom in the selection of marriage partners or in the adoption of religious 
beliefs or affiliations.  Just as it is regarded as prima facie unjust to abridge these 
liberties, so too is it presumptively unjust to abridge the economic liberties of 
individuals. 
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 953 (1984).  
Contract law “assign[s] responsibility to individuals through actions in the private market.”  
Feinman, at 818.     
 
46
 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text. 
 
47
 For a discussion of the competing policy interests implicated in the restrictive 
employment covenant scenario, see supra note 10.  “The law governing restraint of trade has 
become so well established through legislation and judicial decisions that arguably it should 
no longer be considered part of the doctrine of public policy.”  Prince, supra note 43, at 184-
85.  See also FARNSWORTH 4th ed., supra note 6, § 5.3. 
[Restrictive] employment [covenants], however, are still governed by common law 
rules.  In these types of cases, there are no flat prohibitions against promises that 
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The Supreme Court of Montana’s narrative, which stands in sharp contrast to the 
neutral tone of the trial court opinion, incorporates humor48 along with other 
elements of style, including silence or omission, factual compression, and over-
simplification to provide additional lessons in critical reading49 and a powerful 
reminder that judicial opinions are as much persuasive documents as are appellate 
briefs and memoranda submitted by attorneys on behalf of the litigants they 
represent.50  The court's humorous approach also presents the legal issues “in a novel 
or exciting way” and this “break . . . from formality is more likely to resonate with”51 
                                                          
restrict competition or employment.  Instead, this area of the law is permeated by rules 
of reason stressing that while restraints on competition and employment are generally 
not in the best public interest of promoting free enterprise, competition, and 
employment, occasionally those goals or other important interests are served by 
enforcing some restraints.  More specifically, when parties have freely contracted to 
restrict their activities in this area, those agreements ought to be enforced unless a 
well-defined public interest would be derogated. 
Prince, supra note 43, at 185.  “The majority of states follow this general rule; however, some 
states, including California, have determined that as a matter of law covenants not to compete 
outside of the context of a sale of a business are unenforceable."  Doreen E. Lilienfeld & Sean 
McGrath, Drafting and Negotiating Public Company Executive Employment Agreements, 
1858 PLI/CORP 235, 256 n.19 (2011). 
 
48
 “Commentators, and judges themselves, disagree as to the propriety of humor and other 
literary devices in judicial opinions.”  Adalberto Jordan, Imagery, Humor, and the Judicial 
Opinion, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 693, 699 (1987).    
 
49
 Close, critical reading “attends to the implicit text as well as the explicit text and . . . 
puts more of it in question.”  Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of 
Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163, 164 (1993).  As one expert 
noted, 
The reading process . . . is an extremely complicated activity in which the mind is at 
one and the same time relaxed and alert, expanding meanings as it selects and 
modifies them, confronting the blanks and filling them with . . . connections.  Because 
of the nature of the reading process, each reading remains as “indeterminate” as the 
text that it is a response to.  But this is precisely the kind of activity—demanding, 
challenging, constantly structuring them as they structure it—that our students are 
either reluctant or have not been trained to see as reading.  Specifically, it is with the 
indeterminacy of the text that they have their major difficulties.  In their responses to a 
literary text most students do perform that one action, consistency building, that is 
central to the reading activity, and they identify what they consider the main idea.  
They fail, however, to realize that the identification of one idea among many others is 
only one step toward a more complete and dynamic reading.  They perform one 
synthesis rather than various syntheses and tend to settle too soon, too quickly, for a 
kind of incomplete, “blocked” reading. 
Id. at 172 (quoting Mariolina Salvatori, Reading and Writing a Text: Correlations Between 
Reading and Writing Patterns, 45 C. ENG. 657, 661-62 (1983)).   
 
50
 See supra note 22.  One significant difference separating these documents is that the 
litigants and attorneys do not have an opportunity to “talk back” to the court, rendering the 
court's opinion the final word on the issues.  Richard H. Underwood, What Gets Judges in 
Trouble, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 101, 131 & n.147 (2003).      
 
51
 Ryan Benjamin Witte, The Judge as Author / The Author as Judge, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 37, 48 (2009).  One judge described the judicial opinion as follows: “‘[w]riting 
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the reader as it simultaneously deflects attention from the unspoken underlying 
tensions in public policy and invites the reader to adopt a similarly playful, 
lighthearted approach to these unsympathetic litigants.52  The case, therefore, also 
serves as an important lesson to readers to closely scrutinize unconventional 
opinions, and, in this way, to “talk back” to court decisions, assessing their impact 
upon and their statements about courts, litigants, their attorneys, and the culture 
within which they all operate.53   
A court opinion is affected by and is, therefore, a reflection of the larger culture 
within which it operates and is also a transformative agent of culture.54  The Supreme 
                                                          
opinions is a lot like writing briefs.  Both are, at bottom, efforts to persuade.’”  Gerald 
Lebovitz et al., Ethical Judicial Opinion Writing, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237, 237 & n.352 
(2008) (quoting Judith S. Kaye, Judges as Wordsmiths, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10, 10 (Nov. 1997)).  
Although students can readily identify the persuasion inherent in a concurring or dissenting 
opinion, they sometimes struggle to identify persuasion in a majority or unanimous court 
opinion, often because the court’s language appears neutral and the persuasion is, therefore, 
subtle.  Julie M. Spanbauer, Teaching First-Semester Students that Objective Analysis 
Persuades, 5 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 167, 178 (1999).  “In other words, 
‘they fail to see how’ the court ‘worked the text on them.’”  Id. (quoting Fajans & Falk, supra 
note 49, at 164). 
 
52
 Of course, the use of humor may backfire in that it may “cause a reader to question 
whether the court has truly given careful thought to the decision.”  Jennifer Sheppard, The 
“Write” Way: A Judicial Clerk’s Guide to Writing for the Court, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 73, 109-
110 (2008). 
 
53
 See supra notes 17, 20, 49, and 50.  Given the fact that an important goal of legal 
education is to teach students to become expert legal readers, the Carroll v. Beardon decision 
is a wonderful vehicle for illustrating and guiding the students through the various stages in 
the development of critical reading skills: 
We must develop techniques that help them move past “stage-one” legal reading 
(reading for what the court says it is saying) through “stage-two” reading, that is, 
beyond unquestioning acceptance of textual authority and “found” meaning to an 
open-ended process of unselfconscious response and self-aware reflection.  Then 
students can move to “stage-three” where purpose informs a “final” reading, where 
readers take control over “‘two or more opposite or antithetical ideas, images or 
concepts simultaneously’ activated by the text and thereby synthesize its proliferant 
meanings as fully as they can.” 
Fajans & Falk, supra note 49, at 190 (quoting Michael L. Johnson, Hell is the Place We Don’t 
Know We’re In: The Control-Dictions of Cultural Literacy, Strong Reading, and Poetry, 50 C. 
ENG. 309, 314 (1988) (quoting Albert Rothenberg, The Emerging Goddess: The Creative 
Process in Art, Science and Other Fields 49, 55 (1979))).  For an evaluation of the different 
ways in which expert lawyers and novice law students read a case, see Leah M. Christensen, 
The Paradox of Legal Expertise: A Study of Experts and Novices Reading the Law, 2008 
B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 53, 82-83. 
 
54
 For a definition of culture and an explanation of the social constructivist view of culture 
upon which this article is premised, see supra notes 17 and 20.  A more basic definition of 
culture includes: 
[A]ll the customs, values, and traditions that are learned from one’s environment.  [I]n 
a culture there is a “set of people who have common and shared values, customs, 
habits, and rituals; systems of labeling, explanations, and evaluations; social rules of 
behavior; perceptions regarding human nature, natural phenomena, interpersonal 
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Court of Montana's decision in Carroll v. Beardon, thus, provides scholars with a 
snapshot in time of the cultural values and sexual mores the court was affected by 
and the cultural values and mores it constructed, its relationship to the legislature, its 
complicity with the agents of the criminal justice system in condoning and validating 
this house of prostitution, and its relationship to the litigants, the attorneys, and the 
larger community.55  
The language employed by the court in communicating its decision is as 
important as are the “legal and historical context and omissions of fact or lapses in 
logic.”56  Because language and culture are interdependent and socially constructed, 
language is both a reflection of and producer of culture.57  A close reading of the 
court’s “literary style and jurisprudential or interpretive posture”58 reveals that this 
language is neither lighthearted nor humorous in its effect on the litigants and in its 
value as precedent. 
The court’s language, and in particular, the humor, which pervades the entire 
majority opinion and is aimed at both the parties and their attorneys, initially appears 
innocuous, but in fact, has a far-reaching effect.59  For example, the court began its 
                                                          
relationships, time, and activity; symbols, art, and artifacts; and historical 
developments.” 
Paul R. Tremblay, Papers Presented at the UCLA/IALS Conference on “Problem Solving in 
Clinical Education”: Interviewing and Counseling Across Cultures: Heuristics and Biases, 9 
CLINICAL L. REV. 373, 379 (2002) (quoting Gargi Roysircar Sodowsky et al., Ethnic Identity 
in the United States, in HANDBOOK OF MULTICULTURAL COUNSELING (Joseph G. Ponterotto et 
al., eds., 1995) (quoting Gargi Roysircar Sodowsky et al., Moderating Effects of Sociocultural 
Variables on Acculturation Variables of Hispanics and Asian Americans, 70 J. COUNS. & DEV. 
194 (1991))). 
 
55
 See supra notes 17 and 20.  For this reason, “context teaching” is an important aspect of 
helping students gain cultural literacy in their studies of cases.  Debra Moss Curtis, Teach the 
Children Well: Incorporating Cultural Literacy into the Law School Learning Experience, 37 
CUMB. L. REV. 177, 219 (2007).  In context teaching, “the case itself becomes about more than 
the analysis or outcome; it becomes about the facts and history leading up to it, about the 
people involved in it, and the roles that lawyers could take in solving this problem in a 
different way.”  Id. 
 
56
 Fajans & Falk, supra note 49, at 169. 
 
57
 See Julie M. Spanbauer, Lost in Translation in the Law School Classroom: Assessing 
Required Coursework in LL.M. Programs for International Students, 35 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 
396, 399 & n.12 (2007) (discussing the social construction of language in a cross-cultural 
context).   
 
58
 Fajans & Falk, supra note 49, at 169.   
 
59
 Jordan, supra note 48, at 727 (asserting that “law reflects society and culture”).  The use 
of humor in a judicial opinion speaks volumes because, “for the most part, writing opinions is 
a very serious and focused business.”  The Honorable Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., Judiciary Special 
Issue, Foreword, 38 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008).  Those who oppose humor in appellate 
court opinions argue that it “interferes with the goals of justifying the outcome to the litigants 
and the public . . . [and that] it fails to show the litigants the proper respect by making light of 
their situation . . . [and it] may cause a reader to question whether the court has truly given 
careful thought to the decision.”  Sheppard, supra note 52, at 109-10.  Those who favor 
judicial humor assert that it succeeds when used sparingly.  Yury Kapgan, Of Golf and 
Ghouls: The Prose Style of Justice Scalia, 9 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 71, 78 
(2003).  The proponents contend that humor may create an informal tone rendering it more 
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analysis by noting that the “matter was submitted to the district court on depositions 
of the parties involved” and followed with an apparently playful explanation that 
“neither counsel had the effrontery to parade these indignant madams before the 
court.”60  A critical approach to this language is revealing.  Beginning first with the 
court’s description of the two litigants as “indignant madams,” this all-male court’s 
mocking tone appears sexist as evidenced by the adjective invoked, “indignant,” to 
ascribe to the parties a strong conviction or belief in the justness of their cause and in 
their entitlement to a remedy as it simultaneously reminds the reader with the noun 
that this adjective modifies, “madams,” that the litigants are, in fact, petty 
criminals.61  In the same sentence, the court’s use of the word, “effrontery,” although 
couched in sarcasm, could be interpreted to suggest the court’s view that these 
parties, whom the court went on to describe as “madams, in the limited sense of the 
word,” were also not entitled to the same right to present live testimony as is enjoyed 
by other litigants, and that had they invoked the trial court in this manner, their 
actions would have been deemed bold, brazen, and possibly unwelcome.62  The 
court’s intent as to these matters cannot be ascertained, but this interpretation of the 
court’s language is consistent with a recurring theme in the legal and political history 
of prostitution in this country, and, more prominently, in the Western United States: 
The prostitution business, which was critical to the western movement, was and will 
be tolerated as long as its participants remain essentially invisible to, or within a 
                                                          
accessible and that “‘[h]umor can be an exceedingly persuasive device.’”  Id. at 78-79.  All 
seem to agree that when it takes over or dominates the opinion, the reasoning and analysis 
suffer.  Lebovitz, supra note 51, at 237 & n.242.  There is uniform agreement that humor at 
the expense of the parties is an inappropriate, aggressive act: “‘[f]or a judge to take advantage 
of his criticism-insulated, retaliation-proof position to display his wit is contemptible. . . .’”  
Id. at 237 & n. 246 (quoting George Rose Smith, A Primer of Opinion Writing, For Four New 
Judges, 21 ARK. L. REV. 197, 210 (1967)).       
 
60
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 295-96 (Mont. 1963). 
 
61
 Id.  The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice James T. Harrison.  Id. at 295.  
Justice Wesley Castles and Stanley M. Doyle joined in the opinion.  Id. at 297.  The dictionary 
entry for the adjective, “indignant,” is “filled with indignation,” the latter of which is defined 
as “anger aroused by something unjust, unworthy, or mean.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 634 (11th ed. 2009).  The word, “indignant,” modifies the noun, 
“madam,” reminding the reader that the parties were subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor 
offense.  Montana statutory law then existing declared: 
Every person who keeps any disorderly house or any house for the purpose of 
assignation or prostitution, or any house of public resort, by which the peace, comfort, 
or decency of the immediate neighborhood is habitually disturbed, or who keeps any 
inn in a disorderly manner, and every person who lets any apartment or tenement 
knowing that it is to be used for the purpose of assignation or prostitution, is guilty of 
a misdemeanor. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-3608 (1947).           
 
62
 Carroll, 381 P.2d at 296.  The word, “effrontery,” is defined as “shameless, boldness: 
insolence,” with “temerity” listed as a synonym.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 397.   
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particular area that is either out of sight or segregated from, the larger, respectable 
community.63   
It is true that the decision to present the parties’ depositions in lieu of live 
testimony may, in fact, have been expedient and economically efficient, especially in 
light of the undisputed factual record.64  Other facts in the record, however, reveal 
that Ms. Beardon’s attorney, in particular, may have understood that he was not 
playing by the usual rules and that he must proceed cautiously in pursuing his client's 
defense.  For example, in the opening line of his trial brief, Ms. Beardon’s attorney 
apologized: 
At the outset of this brief, we must apologize to the Court for the type of 
case that has been presented for adjudication.  However, under our rules 
of judicial procedure and Constitution, persons charged with acts of 
treason or rebellion, and those charged with rape and other reprehensible 
crimes, are entitled to counsel.  We take the position that by the same 
reasoning, the professional madam of a bawdy-house is likewise entitled 
to counsel and representation and we are, therefore, submitting this brief 
on that premise.65         
His exaggerated and overstated comparison of his client's activity to treason, “rape 
and other reprehensible crimes,”66 may simply have been intended to show respect 
for the tribunal and to separate himself from his client and thereby align himself with 
the court as an officer of the court engaged in a noble act of representing an 
                                                          
 
63
 By the beginning of the twentieth century, prostitution in Montana was “segregated by 
zoning into red-light districts.”  Robert Harvie & Patrick C. Jobes, Social Control of Vice in 
Post-Frontier Montana, 17 J. OF RURAL STUDIES 235, 242 (2001).  Although prostitution in 
Butte and other Montana towns was not expressly authorized by law, a system of monthly 
fines collected by police officers and elected officials permitted prostitutes to ply their trade.  
Ellen Baumler, The End of the Line: Butte, Anaconda, and the Landscape of Prostitution, 
DRUMLUMMON VIEWS, Spring 2009, at 290, available at http://www.drumlummon.org/ 
images/DV_vol3-no1_PDFs/DV_vol3-no1_Baumler.pdf.  Even when laws were subsequently 
enacted prohibiting prostitution, it continued with a public scandalous closing of a brothel in 
Butte, Montana occurring as recently as 1971.  Id. at 294.  “The United States is one of the 
few Western nations in which all forms of prostitution are illegal almost everywhere.  
Nonetheless, despite its prohibition, prostitution continues to occur widely. . . .”  Scott A. 
Anderson, Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy: Making Sense of the Prohibition of 
Prostitution, 112 No. 4 ETHICS 748, 748-49 (July 2002).   
 
64
 “Litigation is risky, time consuming, and expensive.”  Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., 
Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & 
L. 133, 134 (2010).  It may also be true that neither Ms. Carroll nor Ms. Beardon wished to 
testify in court to their status as madams, but given the fact that they had already made 
admissions in sworn statements under oath, such live testimony would not have rendered them 
more culpable or have exposed them to greater criminal liability.  See supra notes 38-42 and 
accompanying text.    
 
65
 Defendant’s Memorandum of Authorities at 1, Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295 (Mont. 
1963) (No. 8657) (hereinafter Defendant's Memorandum).  This document was not a part of 
the Transcript.  It was obtained from the clerk of the District Court for the Ninth Judicial 
District of Toole County and is available and on file with the author. 
 
66
 Id.  
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unpopular defendant.67  It is telling, however, that this statement was made by a local 
Shelby attorney who may not have regularly appeared before this particular judge.68   
The court’s jabs are not limited to the parties and their attorneys, but can also be 
found in the Supreme Court of Montana’s similarly cavalier attitude toward the 
law.69  The detailed and thoroughly researched briefs submitted by the attorneys on 
behalf of their clients70 stand in sharp contrast to the court’s dismissive humor and 
sloppy analysis: “Counsel on both sides . . . dig deep in legal lore to convince the 
court of the righteousness of their client’s cause.”71  The nominalization, 
“righteousness,” when combined with the noun it modifies, “cause,” connotes a 
moral high ground related to a principle or movement these attorneys are 
defending.72  By invoking a parallel structure to describe the attorneys and their 
clients, the court appears to suggest that the attorneys share their clients' views, 
thereby, aligning the attorneys with the “indignant madams” they represent, and 
implying that the attorneys, along with their clients, should not be taken seriously.73  
                                                          
 
67
 See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 143-55 (2010).  “[L]awyers 
are not, strictly speaking, required to represent any particular client.”  Id. at 151.  “The 
existence of discretion within the role [of attorney] does not mean, however, that a lawyer 
who represents an unpopular client endorses the client’s projects or values.  Rather, the lawyer 
should be seen as endorsing more general political values embodied in the legal system.”  Id. 
at 147. 
 
68
 From the beginning, Ms. Beardon was represented by counsel from Shelby, Montana, 
but at the time Ms. Beardon’s attorney filed Defendant’s Memorandum, Judge Black had been 
disqualified and Judge McKinnon from the Tenth Judicial District had been assigned to the 
case.  See supra note 38.  For a discussion of the reasons for Judge Black’s disqualification in 
this case, see infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.  Ms. Carroll was originally 
represented by an attorney whose law practice was located in Shelby.  On January 11, 1961, 
he withdrew and was replaced by an attorney from Great Falls, Montana, a distance of almost 
90 miles.  Transcript, supra note 35, at 12.  See also MAPQUEST, http://www.mapquest.com.   
 
69
 See Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 296 (Mont. 1963). 
 
70
 The Court similarly dismissed Canadian precedent presented by Ms. Beardon’s 
attorney, “perhaps because his client’s place of business is some 50 miles from the Canadian 
border, and to give the case a good neighborly aroma, he cites and argues . . . a case from our 
neighboring province of Alberta.”  Id. at 296.  The Appellant’s Brief submitted on behalf of 
Ms. Beardon was twenty-six pages in length.  Appellant’s Brief, Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 
295 (Mont. 1963) (No. 10493).  The Brief of Respondent, filed on behalf of Ms. Carroll, was 
nineteen pages.  Brief of Respondent, Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295 (Mont. 1963) (No. 
10493).  Both documents thoroughly analyzed and presented available legal authority.  Both 
briefs were obtained from Susan Lupton, Reference Librarian, State Law Library of Montana 
(email: mtlawlibrary@mt.gov; web: www.courts.mt.gov/library/).  These documents are 
available and on file with the author.   
 
71
 Carroll, 381 P.2d at 296. 
 
72
 “Righteousness” refers to “an outraged sense of justice or morality,” or to feelings of 
“indignation.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1073.  The 
word “cause” as used in the sentence refers to “a principle or movement militantly defended 
or supported.”  Id. at 196. 
 
73
 See WENDEL, supra note 67, at 147 (discussing the fact that a lawyer’s choice to 
represent “an unpopular client” is not an endorsement of the client’s views or actions).  The 
Supreme Court of Montana, of course, knew that lawyers who voluntarily take on unpopular 
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The court’s characterization of the extensive body of available precedent as “lore” is 
more troubling as it appears to equate the relevant precedent with traditional 
knowledge or common understanding rather than with judge-made law, and perhaps 
to suggest an association with folklore or popular myth.74  Once again, the Supreme 
Court of Montana’s intent cannot be ascertained with certainty, but such a 
characterization of the law is consistent with, and compounded by, the Supreme 
Court of Montana’s decision to ignore an entire line of authority addressing the 
improper use defense as it applies to contracts involving prostitution.75  
Instead, the court chose to rely principally upon a decision of the Supreme Court 
of Wyoming, Fuchs v. Goe, in which the Wyoming Court enforced a contract for a 
five-year lease of nightclub premises and contents, the latter of which included 
gambling equipment.76  The Supreme Court of Montana’s choice to analogize 
prostitution to gambling is certainly defensible.77  The problem, however, is first, 
with the Supreme Court of Montana’s mischaracterization of the transaction 
                                                          
clients “are expressing fidelity to the legal system and the values it embodies.”  Id. at 145.  
This view that lawyers endorse their clients’ values and goals “is a familiar theme.  It has 
equivalents in ordinary morality, particularly folk maxims. . . .”  Id. at 144-45.  The Supreme 
Court of Montana’s characterization of the attorneys in this manner, therefore, provides 
evidence that it may have been appealing to public opinion rather than focusing on a legal 
resolution of a dispute and the creation of precedent.  See infra notes 98-101 and 
accompanying text.   
 
74
 Lore is defined as “knowledge gained through study or experience,” “traditional 
knowledge or belief,” and “a particular body of knowledge or tradition.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 735.  To the extent an association with folklore 
may have been intended, a body of judge-made law is not tantamount to an “unsupported 
notion, story, or saying that is widely circulated.”   Id. at 486.  Such law is similarly not 
consistent with “a popular belief or tradition that has grown up around something” that may be 
“unfounded or false.”  Id. at 822 (defining “myth”).   
 
75
 See infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text. 
 
76
 Fuchs v. Goe, 163 P.2d 783, 784-785 (Wyo. 1945).  The gambling equipment consisted 
of the following: “1 roulette table, 1 roulette checks, 9 game chairs, 1 crap table, 1 ‘21’ table, 
3 Table Layouts.”  Id. at 785.     
 
77
 Historically, “red-light districts were neighborhoods officially set aside where 
prostitution, liquor, and gambling laws were relaxed and other forms of criminality were 
notorious.”  Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1734 (2006).  
See also Peter C. Hennigan, Property War: Prostitution, Red-Light Districts, and the 
Transformation of Public Nuisance Law in the Progressive Era, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 123, 
125-126 (2004).  Montana legislation followed this pattern as to prostitution and gambling, 
treating them as nuisances: 
Section 11124, Revised Codes, provides: “Every building or place used for the 
purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, and every building or place wherein 
or upon which acts of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution are held to occur, and any 
building wherein gambling is carried on or occurs, contrary to any of the laws of the 
state of Montana, . . . is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented as 
hereinafter provided, whether the same be a public or private nuisance.” 
State ex rel. Nagle v. Naughton, 63 P.2d 123, 125 (Mont. 1936).  For the version of the statute 
in effect at the time the Supreme Court of Montana rendered its decision in Carroll, see infra 
note 132.                 
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involved in the case as a “sale of gambling equipment” followed by a block quote 
taken from the Fuchs case, which described the transaction as involving a lease.78  In 
addition to its apparent failure to read a case it quoted and relied upon, the Supreme 
Court of Montana additionally failed to take notice of the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming’s primary reason for rejecting the public policy defense to contract 
enforcement—there were too “few items of gambling equipment which were 
included in the elaborate list of personal property which Fuchs leased to Goe”79 to 
render the entire contract unenforceable on public policy grounds: 
As we look at the matter, it would appear to be a harsh rule if an action 
for the recovery of the value of property stated by plaintiff, Fuchs, to be 
over $14,000, must fail because a few items of gambling equipment, also 
valued by him at $850 and which were never used by the lessee [Goe], 
were included in the list of the leased property.  Indeed, it would seem, 
from the stipulation of the parties under date of March 22, 1944, and 
hereinbefore reviewed, that this gambling equipment had been returned to 
Fuchs long before this case was tried and so had thereby been removed 
from the controversy entirely.  Counsel for defendant at the argument, as 
we understood it, conceded that it was not included in the trial court’s 
judgment. . . .80  
These facts clearly distinguish the Fuchs case from a situation in which the sole use 
of the property subject to the contract was to facilitate criminal activity in the form 
of prostitution.81 
                                                          
 
78
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 297 (Mont. 1963) (quoting Fuchs, 163 P.2d at 787 
(quoting 32 AM. JUR. § 49)).  It did involve an option to purchase the leased property, which is 
the likely source of the Supreme Court of Montana’s confusion.  Fuchs, 163 P.2d at 785. 
 
79
 Id. at 787. 
 
80
 Id. at 788-89.   
 
81
 Of course, Ms. Beardon also lived on the premises, but the evidence clearly indicates 
that Ms. Beardon intended to use the premises for prostitution and without this use, there 
would be no contract.  See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.  There is also evidence 
that neither Ms. Beardon nor her husband lived at the premises full time; in fact Ms. Beardon 
testified in her deposition that she left for several months because she “had a job to go to.”  
Transcript, supra note 35, at 51, 53, 58. 
Not to be outdone by the majority, another justice added to the murkiness of the Supreme 
Court of Montana’s pronouncement in a single paragraph, separate opinion professing to be 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, but he apparently misunderstood the meaning of 
dissent as he had no disagreement with the decision of the majority of the court.  This opinion 
in its entirety reads: 
I concur in the result, but not in all that is said in the above opinion.  This is the case 
of the pot calling the kettle black.  However, the calling of names will not pay the 
promissory note nor discharge nor invalidate the mortgage upon which this action was 
brought.  Each party to the contract is required to keep her promises and to perform 
her obligations thereunder.  Refusal and failure to keep her promises or to perform her 
obligations subject the defaulting defendant, Agnes Beardon, to the penalties that 
attach upon the breach of her contract. These penalties were lawfully invoked and 
judgment for the plaintiff, Edna Carroll, rightfully given and entered. 
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Accepting the Supreme Court of Montana’s decision to adopt a test requiring that 
the contract be enforced unless the seller actively participated in the buyer’s intended 
improper use, the court never explained why, for instance, Ms. Carroll’s anticipated 
receipt over time of payments known to be derived from or generated solely by 
prostitution was insufficient to satisfy the active participation test, and in so doing, 
discourages the reader from such analysis.82  Once again, silence operates as a 
persuasive tool in this court’s opinion. 
The court similarly failed to mention evidence in the record that strongly 
supports the improper use defense.  For example, when Ms. Carroll initially 
purchased the property in 1956, she testified that she paid $6,000.00,83 and, in an 
apparent attempt to increase her prostitution business, she thereafter added a second 
story to the house, which included five additional bedrooms, two bathrooms, and 
two “parlors,” before selling to Ms. Beardon four years later for a price of 
                                                          
Carroll, 381 P.2d at 297 (Adair, J., concurring and dissenting).  In fact, his only disagreement 
is with the reasoning of the majority—a classic concurrence.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 309 
(8th ed. 2004).  If read literally, this concurring opinion, which makes no reference to rules of 
contract interpretation regarding a public policy defense, could be interpreted as an argument 
that short of contracts involving wholly illegal consideration or contracts whose only purpose 
is to perform illegal acts, no public policy defense to contract enforcement should be 
recognized. Carroll, 381 P.2d at 297.  In essence, Justice Adair’s opinion appears to more 
accurately reflect the motivations underlying the majority opinion. 
 
82
 See infra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.  Ms. Beardon’s deposition testimony is 
also relevant as to her view of the consideration and what it reflected: 
Ms. Carroll’s attorney: “Wasn’t that a fair price for 
the property?” 
Ms. Beardon’s response: “As a house of prostitution it 
was, yes.” 
Ms. Carroll’s attorney: “Mrs. Beardon, I am going to 
insist that you answer my questions directly without 
adding your comments.  The price of $50,000.00 for 
50 acres of land and the house with all the rooms that 
you described and all the personal property you 
obtained, had a reasonable value of $50,000.00, did it 
not?” 
Ms. Beardon’s response: “I wouldn’t know.”  
Transcript, supra note 35, at 59-60. 
 
83
 Id. at 74.  This mortgage deed was not a part of the record in this case.  An independent 
research at the Toole County Recorder’s Office revealed that the deed listed Ms. Carroll’s 
purchase price on February 18, 1956 as being much lower: “[a]ctual consideration less than 
$100.00.”  66 Warranty Deed 503.  There were no United States Internal Revenue Tax Stamps 
on the Deed, which would reflect the actual purchase price, depending upon then prevailing 
real estate sales tax rates.  71 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 567.  The tax “is a 
relatively small percentage of the consideration” and “must be paid as a prerequisite to 
recording the transfer instrument[].”  Id.  It appears that if Ms. Carroll did, in fact pay 
$6,000.00 to purchase the Hillside Ranch, she may have listed a much lower purchase price on 
the mortgage deed to avoid paying taxes on the sale.     
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$50,000.00.84  Because it is implausible that a mere four years later these 
improvements would increase the market value of this same rural property by more 
than 800%, the $50,000.00 sales price provides strong evidence that the bargained-
for consideration represented the sale of an ongoing prostitution business in the same 
manner in which parties value good will as a component of the purchase price in the 
sale of an ongoing legitimate business.85    
Additional evidence in the record reveals that neither party had the property 
appraised or had any awareness of comparable property values at the time they 
negotiated the price term, further suggesting that the consideration exchanged had 
nothing to do with the value of the property as a residence surrounded by acres of 
farmland.86  Neither Ms. Carroll nor Ms. Beardon had the property surveyed and 
neither knew the precise acreage.87  In fact, Ms. Beardon testified in her deposition: 
“When I bought it [Hillside Ranch] Mrs. Carroll said she didn’t know for sure on 
that, but she thought it was 50 or 49 acres.  She didn’t know exactly.”88  The 
mortgage documents include a detailed description of the property, a portion of 
which expressly describes the property as “embracing and including 10 acres, more 
or less.”89  This detailed description, when converted to acres, reveals that the 
property encompassed approximately ten acres of land and, at the very least, 
establishes that Ms. Carroll and Ms. Beardon were not concerned with the value of 
the property as conventionally measured, and, in fact, overestimated the acreage by 
500%.90 
                                                          
 
84
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 35.  After the addition was built, there were eight 
bedrooms.  Id. at 74.  The furnishings were described by Ms. Beardon in her deposition as 
being “secondhand” and “old,” some of which had allegedly been transferred from Ms. 
Carroll’s prostitution business at the Viaduct Hotel: “I don’t know how old they were.  Some 
of them were brought up from the Viaduct, they tell me.”  Id. at 67.       
 
85
 Good will is an intangible business asset, which can be valued in different ways.  Kevin 
M. Kelly, Comment, Drafting Enforceable Covenants Not to Compete in Author-Publisher 
Agreements Under New York Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 119, 126 n.25 (1988) (defining good 
will as primarily consisting of the “customers of a business whose patronage has become an 
asset of the business”) (internal quotations omitted).  In her deposition, Ms. Carroll estimated 
that the furnishings and personal property accounted for $6,000.00 of the total sales price with 
the house and land accounting for $44,000.00 of the price.  Transcript, supra note 35, at 84-
85.     
 
86
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 60, 70, 84. 
 
87
 Id. at 67-68.   
 
88
 Id. 
 
89
 70 Warranty Deed 342 (dated March 14, 1960 and filed April 18, 1960).  See also 
Transcript, supra note 35, at 2. 
 
90
 Although not a part of the evidence in the case, the mortgage documents were obtained 
for Ms. Carroll’s original purchase in 1956 and for her later sale of the property in 1965, two 
years after the judgment against Ms. Beardon was enforced by a public auction at which Ms. 
Carroll regained title to the property when she bid $20,000.  See supra note 83 (discussing 
1956 and 1965 mortgage deeds); note 145 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement of 
judgment through public auction).  This same statement to the effect that the property includes 
ten acres of land is on the warranty deed Ms. Carroll provided when she subsequently sold to 
Marian Martin on October 13, 1965.  80 Warranty Deed 253.  This description of the land as 
encompassing “ten acres more or less” was not included in the warranty deed provided to Ms. 
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The court did mention the fact that the contract was structured to require higher 
monthly payments “during the harvest months,” but failed to mention the deposition 
testimony of a nonparty witness to a segment of the contract negotiations who 
clarified any lingering doubt that the reference to the harvest season was a reference 
to an increased demand for prostitutes.91  Geirthana Wilson, who was initially hired 
to work for Ms. Carroll as a maid at the Hillside Ranch and who continued to live 
and work “off and on” there when Ms. Beardon purchased the property, testified that 
“Mrs. Carroll said to Mrs. Beardon, ‘You can make good money here.  It is slow in 
the winter, but you can make good money during the harvest season.’”92  Taken 
together, this evidence reveals that the very structure of the payment terms, designed 
as they were to reflect fluctuations in the prostitution business, contemplated that the 
only source of money to pay the mortgage was to be derived from prostitution, and 
Ms. Carroll actively accommodated that business use of the premises in the way she 
agreed to structure the payment terms in the contract.93  
                                                          
Carroll by Fred Marlett when she originally purchased the property on February 18, 1956.  66 
Warranty Deed 503.  With the exception of the reference to ten acres, all three deeds, 
including the deed involved in the case, describe the area of land included in the property 
precisely as follows: 
Beginning with a point which is the Southwest corner of SW1/4 SW1/4 of  Sec. 23, 
Twp. 32N., Rge. 2W.; thence North on said section line a distance of 80 rods to the 
Northwest corner of said SW1/4 SW1/4 of said Sec. 23; thence East along the North 
line of said SW1/4 SW1/4 of Sec. 23 for a distance of 40 rods; thence running 
Southwesterly from said last mentioned point for a distance of 89.442 rods, to the 
point of beginning, embracing and including 10 acres, more or less. 
Transcript, supra note 35, at 2.  At the outset, it should be noted that the reference to a 
boundary running from the southwest corner of the property north “on said section line” must 
be understood.  Id.  The Public Land Survey System of 1785, created a standard system for 
surveying western public land, with section lines on these surveyed lands  forming “a grid of 
north-south and east-west lines spaced at one mile intervals.”  Bret C. Birdsong, Road Rage 
and R.S. 2477: Judicial and Administrative Responsibility for Resolving Road Claims on 
Public Lands, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 523, 528 n.12 (2005).  The Western boundary of the property, 
thus, runs on a straight line from the south to the north a distance of 80 rods.  One rod equals 
5.50 yards; the distance south to north is, therefore, 440 yards (80 x 5.5).  MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1420.  The north boundary runs east at a right 
angle for 40 rods or 220 yards (5.5 x 40).  “[T]he area of a right triangle is one-half the 
product of its two legs,” Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 79 (2009).  
Thus, the area or acreage is (440 x 220)/2 = 48,400 square yards.  This figure must then be 
converted to acres: one acre equals 4,840 square yards.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY, supra note 61, at 1420.  48,400/4,840 = 10 acres.     
 
91
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 296 (Mont. 1963) (the Court’s precise reference was 
to “the harvest months and the Christmas season,” but this latter period was not mentioned by 
either the parties or Ms. Wilson and is apparently another attempt at judicial humor). 
 
92
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 96-98.  Ms. Wilson testified that she was in the living room 
within “two or three feet” of Ms. Carroll and Ms. Beardon for “two or three minutes” during 
their conversation.  Id. at 98.      
 
93
 Id. at 4.  
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Ms. Wilson also testified to a conversation she had with Ms. Carroll the day after 
she witnessed the contract negotiations.94  This conversation provides additional 
evidence of Ms. Carroll’s understanding regarding Ms. Beardon’s intended use of 
the premises: “Mrs. Carroll said to me, ‘If the joint was closed I [Ms. Carroll] would 
have to give her [Ms. Beardon] her money back.’”95  This conversation reveals that 
Ms. Carroll and Ms. Beardon unequivocally contemplated that prostitution was the 
only intended use of the premises and that if the premises could not be used for this 
unlawful purpose, the contract would have no effect.96  These facts, therefore, 
provide additional evidence that the contract involved the sale of an ongoing 
prostitution business, and without this business use, there would be no contract 
because there would be no source of money to satisfy the exceptionally high 
mortgage payments.97  
Unfortunately, the court devoted more attention and care to creating a comedic 
tone than it did to these facts and to its legal analysis in this appeal which it 
apparently did not wish to hear, but was required by law to entertain.98  In 1963, the 
Supreme Court of Montana did not have the authority it currently possesses to 
decline to publish the opinion.99  The humorous tone and style of the majority 
                                                          
 
94
 Id. at 99-100.  Ms. Wilson testified that she and Ms. Carroll were alone in the kitchen at 
the Hillside Ranch the next morning when this conversation occurred.  Id.     
 
95
 Id.  To the extent this conversation arguably reflects the parties’ contractual intent 
regarding a contingency or condition subsequent to formation, there would ordinarily be a 
parol evidence issue presented by this oral testimony.  See Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex 
Harvest States, Coops., Inc., 164 P.3d 851, 857 (Mont. 2007).  Because the contract contains 
all essential terms and is silent as to rescission rights of either party, it is arguably integrated 
and unambiguous.  See Holman v. Hansen, 773 P.2d 1200, 1205 (Mont. 1989).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 209, 210.  Courts and commentators, however, 
agree that the parol evidence rule does not bar admission of such evidence because the 
purpose of the evidence is not to show contractual intent, but rather to establish that the 
contract is not enforceable.  See Plath v. Kline, 45 N.Y.S. 951, 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897) 
(ruling such evidence admissible to show party’s “understanding or intent” as to improper use 
of premises).  See Farnsworth, supra note 6, § 5.1.  In any event, this evidence is cumulative 
of other evidence and, therefore, not necessary to Ms. Beardon’s public policy defense.  See 
supra notes 39-42, 83-84 and accompanying text.     
 
96
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 99-100. 
 
97
 See supra note 82, 93 and accompanying text. 
 
98
 The Montana state court system has no intermediate courts of appeal.  Fiscus v. 
Beartooth Elec. Coop., Inc., 591 P.2d 196, 199 (Mont. 1979).  See Hutchinson v. Burton, 247 
P.2d 987, 991 (1952) (discussing civil trial court litigant’s right to appeal to Supreme Court of 
Montana so long as timely bill of exception is filed).  See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 93-5505 
(1947) (setting time limit for filing bill of exceptions for purposes of appealing a civil trial 
court judgment).   
 
99
 It was not until December 1989 that the Supreme Court of Montana amended its 
“Internal Operating Rules to allow for noncitable, unpublished, abbreviated opinions in certain 
cases.”  Worts v. Hardy Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 231, 237 (Mont. 1991).  The current Supreme 
Court of Montana Internal Operating Rules I.3.(c) provides in pertinent part: 
If an appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, does not 
establish new precedent or modify existing precedent, or, in the opinion of the Court, 
would otherwise not be of future guidance for citation purposes to the citizens of 
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opinion, however, invited and received widespread public attention100 and, in so 
doing, indicated that the cultural context within which the court operated permitted a 
very public judicial indifference to and disrespect of the litigants, their attorneys, and 
the available precedent.101  To the extent that the court’s opinion invited public 
attention, the court’s style and tone are also indicative of confidence that its views 
were in accord with the views of the court’s intended audience—the general 
public.102    
It is understandable that the court was unhappy that it was called upon, and 
indeed required, to resolve this petty dispute.103  The court, however, had other duties 
in this case extending beyond a pair of unsympathetic litigants—the duty to create 
and dispense the law.104  It also bears noting that neither litigant in this case is 
                                                          
Montana, the bench, or the bar, the Court may classify the appeal as one for a 
noncitable opinion.  The decision for the case will provide the ultimate disposition 
without a detailed statement of facts or law.  The decision shall not be citable as 
precedent but shall be filed as a public document with the clerk; shall be reported by 
result only to the State Reporter Publishing Company and to West Group along with 
the case title and Supreme Court cause number. 
MONT. INTERNAL OPERATING R. I.3.(c), available at http://courts.mt.gov/clerk/rules/internal. 
mcpx (emphasis added).  
 
100
 The Supreme Court of Montana’s decision in Carroll v. Beardon received widespread 
attention from newspapers throughout the state.  The appeal was initially reported in a Helena 
newspaper: Where Wild Oats are Sown in Big Wheat Field, INDEPENDENT RECORD, Oct. 26, 
1962, at 7.  Other stories ran after the decision was issued.  See, e.g.,  State’s High Court 
Upholds ‘House’ Sale, BILLINGS GAZETTE, May 10, 1963, at 16; Tongue-in-Cheek Supreme 
Court Upholds Sale of ‘House’ by Ex-Madam to Madam, MONTANA STANDARD AND THE 
BUTTE DAILY POST, May 10, 1963, at 9; Lyle Downing, Court Asked to Fix Issue Involving 
Wild Oats Ranch, INDEPENDENT RECORD, May 9, 1963, at 8.       
 
101
 For a definition of culture and explanations of the social construction of law and culture 
see supra notes 17, 20, 54-57 and accompanying text. 
 
102
 The intended or expected audience is always critical to writing style: 
[T]he audiences from which assent must be won are often multiple.  In many a 
Supreme Court opinion . . . one can detect the Court’s attempts to address different 
listeners: dissenting Brethren first of all, then lower court judges, then state 
legislatures and the police forces of the nation, then the public at large. 
Kapgan, supra note 59, at 97.  Most judges are “driven by the very human desire for popular 
approval and public respect.”  Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Decline and Fall of the American 
Judicial Opinion, Part II: Back to the Future From the Roberts Court to the Learned Hand - 
Segmentation, Audience, and the Opportunity of Justice Sotomayor, 13 BARRY L. REV. 29, 55 
(2009).  Judges are strongly motivated by “the perception of them as ‘elite’ groups in 
American society, ‘whose values are more similar to those of the mass public than they are 
different.’”  Id. (quoting LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 5 (2006)).         
 
103
 Witte, supra note 51, at 63 (discussing as one reason for a humorous tone in a judicial 
opinion “the court’s discontent with being forced to resolve petty disputes”).  For a discussion 
of the reasons that neither party had the higher moral ground in this transaction they both 
benefitted from, see supra notes 39-42, 82-97.   
 
104
 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Natural Law, 79 FORDHAM  L. REV. 1541, 
1542 (2011) (discussing in the context of federal courts “the uncomfortable relationship of 
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sympathetic.  As with criminal defendants who enjoy a presumption of innocence, 
both Ms. Carroll and Ms. Beardon enjoyed a presumption of fair access to the legal 
system to present their claims and defenses and to receive a fair and impartial 
resolution of their dispute, something the Supreme Court of Montana denied them.105   
III.  IMPROPER USE AND THE COURT’S FAILURE TO BALANCE THE PUBLIC POLICY 
INTERESTS 
Although the Supreme Court of Montana failed to balance the competing policy 
interests, this balance also tips in Ms. Beardon's favor.  The court, through its simple 
narrative, effectively ignored the closely competing policies implicated by this 
defense to contract enforcement for which there may be no easy resolution or at least 
no resolution without negative consequences and undesirable incentives.106  In fact, 
the use of humor by the court provides a perfect diversion from the court’s brief 
single sentence concession, buried in the middle of the opinion, that the improper 
use defense presented difficult legal issues over which courts were divided, and the 
closely competing equities presented by the facts of the case tempted the court to 
accept Ms. Beardon’s defense and to decline to enforce the contract.107  
Ms. Beardon’s unsuccessful public policy argument against mortgage 
foreclosure, and any such argument against contract enforcement, operates as “a rare 
limitation on freedom of contract,”108 pursuant to which an individual’s right to enter 
into contracts is considered a paramount right of private lawmaking and private 
                                                          
common-law lawmaking to democracy” in which judges are required “to make choices as to 
what should or should not be the law”).  See also Stephen M. Johnson, From Climate Change 
and Hurricanes to Ecological Nuisances: Common Law Remedies for Public Law Failures?, 
27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565, 574-75 (2011) (discussing the local nature of common law 
adjudication and its benefits in the context of making law in response to environmental 
issues). 
 
105
 See Matthew W. Perkins, Comment, War and National Defense—Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act—Civil Actions and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: You Can 
Knock, But You Can’t Come In, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern 
California v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1991), 16 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 807, 819 
n.54 (1993) (discussing “civil litigant’s inherent right to a fair trial”).   
 
106
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 296-97 (Mont. 1963).  For a discussion of the 
competing policies, see supra note 43, 45 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 108-
113, 116-138, 143-153 and accompanying text. 
 
107
 The Supreme Court of Montana noted that “[m]any courts refuse to aid either party to 
contracts where the transaction is illegal.”  Carroll, 381 P.2d at 296 (internal citations 
omitted).  The court rejected this authority, reasoning instead: 
A review of the evidence put before the court in this case tempts this court to dismiss 
the appeal, however, there are many decisions to the effect that where the sale is of 
property that may or may not be used for an illegal purpose, that it is no defense that 
the seller knew the purpose of the buyer, without further evidence implicating the 
seller. 
Id.   
 
108
 Kostritsky, supra note 43, at 116. 
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ordering.109  Given this strong presumption of enforceability, the Supreme Court of 
Montana may have been motivated to rule as it did in order to promote protection of 
reasonable expectations of contracting parties, which in turn, arguably promotes 
stability in contract law and encourages “the formation of productive contracts that 
contribute to the general economic good.”110  The court may also have been 
motivated, as many courts are in the improper use scenario, by a desire “to protect 
individual liberty.”111  Courts generally refuse enforcement only if the public interest 
in the protection of reasonable expectations and individual liberty is outweighed by 
the countervailing public interest in deterring misconduct and in refusing the use of 
judicial resources to sanction such misconduct, a balancing of interests the Supreme 
                                                          
 
109
 Id.  Freedom of contract exists only if a contract has been freely entered into by all 
parties to the transaction.  Id.   
 
110
 Macintosh, supra note 15, at 1203 (footnote omitted).  “Accordingly, any refusal to 
enforce properly formed contracts must be firmly grounded upon strong countervailing policy 
considerations.”  Id. 
 
111
 Id. at 1204.  The court, however, mentioned none of these concerns, but did mention the 
fact that Ms. Beardon “had the benefit of” the contract and “reaped its benefits” as a factor 
requiring proof of more active participation by Ms. Carroll in the improper use of the 
premises.  Carroll, 381 P.2d at 297.  See also infra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.  
These brief statements may represent a reference to a policy interest routinely deemed less 
important—the interest of the nonbreaching party in avoiding forfeiture due to detrimental 
reliance on the contract. “‘[F]orfeiture’ is used to refer to the denial of compensation that 
results when the obligee loses his right to the agreed exchange after he has relied substantially, 
as by preparation or performance, on the expectation of that exchange.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. b.  “The law abhors forfeitures, therefore every 
reasonable presumption is against a forfeiture.”  Thomas P. Egan, Equitable Doctrines 
Operating Against the Express Provisions of a Written Contract (Or When Black and White 
Equals Gray), 5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 261, 295 (1993).  In the case of contracts in contravention 
of public policy, forfeiture operates as an exception to the rule denying restitution: “[a]ccount 
will be taken of such factors as the extent of the party’s deliberate involvement in any 
misconduct, the gravity of that misconduct, and the strength of the public policy.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 cmt. b.  There is very little relevant case law.  
See, e.g., Yank v. Juhrend, 729 P. 2d 941, 944 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).  The court in Yank also 
found important the fact that the legislation did not declare such contracts void, but rather 
rendered them voidable.  Id.  A final policy consideration is the excusable ignorance 
exception, which is very limited: 
If a promisee is excusably ignorant of facts or of legislation of a minor character, of 
which the promisor is not excusably ignorant and in the absence of which the promise 
would be enforceable, the promisee has a claim for damages for its breach but cannot 
recover damages for anything that he has done after he learns of the facts or 
legislation. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS  § 180.  When the ignorance relates to the law, it is 
excused if the illegality involves something minor and if there was justifiable reliance on the 
specialized knowledge of the other party regarding the law.  See, e.g., Harrison v. Flushing 
Nat’l Bank, 370 N.Y.S.2d 803, 806 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1975).  See also Weinsklar Realty Co. v. 
Dooley, 228 N.W. 515, 518 (Wis. 1930) (enforcing a contract when one party was unaware 
that the other party had signed the contract in violation of a statute prohibiting business 
transactions on Sunday). 
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Court of Montana failed to undertake.112  Given the facts of this case, it is difficult to 
understand how the policy interests favoring contract enforcement outweigh the 
policy interests militating against enforcement.113  In any event, a close reading of 
the case reveals that the court failed to take even a first step in analyzing the 
defense—identification of the public interests at stake in the case.114  This omission 
is not unusual when well-developed tests reflecting the underlying policy interests 
substitute for overt policy analysis, but, in a case of first impression, such as Carroll 
v. Beardon, judicial perceptions of policy are a necessary prerequisite to adoption of 
a test or standard by which to assess the improper use defense.115     
Situated within a policy perspective favoring enforceability, Ms. Beardon's sole 
argument against foreclosure also introduces the reader to a unique and perhaps 
intractable public policy dilemma presented in many cases involving the improper 
use defense—in an effort to evade civil liability, a party must admit in court 
pleadings and under oath to criminal activity.116  These facts, thus, present an 
                                                          
 
112
 Trimble v. Ameritech Publ’g, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1128, 1129 (Ind. 1998) (citing a “‘very 
strong presumption of enforceability’”) (quoting Fresh Cut, Inc., v. Fazli, 650 N.E.2d 1126, 
1130 (Ind. 1995)).  The Trimble court recited five factors Indiana courts consider when they 
assess whether a contract not prohibited by statute nor which tends to injure the public 
contravenes public policy:  
(1) the nature of the subject matter of the contract; (2) the strength of the public policy 
underlying any relevant statute; (3) the likelihood that refusal to enforce the bargain or 
term will further any such policy; (4) how serious or deserved would be the forfeiture 
suffered by the party attempting to enforce the bargain; and (5) the parties’ relative 
bargaining power and freedom to contract. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  In addressing the policy against enforcement, one court 
commented, “[s]traight shooters should always win, but when there are none, bad guys need 
not look to us for help.”  Certa v. Wittman, 370 A.2d 573, 577 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977). 
 
113
 See infra notes 137-150 and accompanying text. 
 
114
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 296-97 (Mont. 1963).  When a contract arguably runs 
afoul of public policy, a court will ordinarily proceed through a “three-step analysis”: 
The court must first ascertain the relevant public interest.  Next, the court must verify 
that there is a conflict between that interest and the contract in question.  Then the 
court must determine what remedy would best serve the public policy interest.  In 
deciding what comprises public interests, the courts look to legislative enactments as 
well as to established notions of public decency that are reflected in past judicial 
decisions. 
Prince, supra note 43, at 171. 
 
115
 Badawi, supra note 7, at 512.  For an example and explanation of areas in which well-
established tests have been created, see supra note 10.   
 
116
 See Badawi, supra note 7, at 488.   
Agreements that are obviously illegal and impose significant harm are unlikely to end 
up in court because they often carry collateral consequences like criminal and civil 
liability.  Taking these cases to court can expose the existence of the bargain to 
prosecutors, potential plaintiffs, and others who can impose the collateral 
consequences.  Contracts that are only arguably illegal and do not obviously impose 
harm are much more likely to be litigated than a drug deal gone wrong or a dispute 
over a murder hit. 
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opportunity for analysis of the built-in tensions facing litigants and courts presented 
with this defense to contract enforcement and of the different functions and 
processes of the criminal and civil law systems operating and overlapping within our 
legal system.117  The built-in disincentive to Ms. Beardon, and to any litigant in her 
position, to assert the improper use defense is ameliorated by the surrounding 
facts—law enforcement officials were aware of and tolerated the improper use over 
time, and the risk of criminal prosecution was, therefore, remote.118  
Research beyond the record in this case, which is not relevant to the court’s 
decision, but which may explain the cultural context within which the court operated 
and was affected by in rendering its decision, revealed overwhelming evidence that 
local law enforcement officials in Shelby, Montana, a rural town with a population at 
the time of approximately 4,000,119 were aware that prostitution was occurring at the 
Hillside Ranch and declined to institute legal proceedings.  Ms. Carroll was known 
by local law authorities and the attorneys involved in the litigation as a madam.  Just 
one year and four months before Ms. Carroll set up business at the Hillside Ranch, in 
October, 1954, W.M. Black, then County Attorney, successfully pursued an action to 
abate a nuisance against Ms. Carroll for running a house of prostitution out of the 
Viaduct Hotel located in Shelby.120  The complaint described the Viaduct Hotel and 
Edna Carroll as follows: 
                                                          
Id. at 487-88.  See also Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 33, at 1445 
(commenting that “[m]ost individuals are not so foolish as to ask a court to enforce a bargain 
to divide ill-gotten gains.”).   
 
117
 Badawi, supra note 7, at 507-08 (explaining that “[t]he tension between the lack of 
harm posed by a particular contract and the aversion to failing to punish illegal conduct 
sometimes arises in doctrine”). 
 
118
 See infra notes 119-127 and accompanying text.  
[C]riminal laws are [frequently] not enforced, or are enforced only rarely, as a matter 
either of deliberate law enforcement policy or because of the practical difficulties of 
enforcement.  Both conditions are frequently encountered in the area of sex crimes.  
For example, although many states retain on their statute books criminal prohibitions 
against adultery and fornication, these laws are almost never enforced.  Sodomy laws 
are with very rare exception enforced only when the offender has committed other 
crimes in which the authorities are also interested.  Some sex laws are enforced 
sporadically (laws against prostitution are a good example), others consistently, such 
as those involving children.  Sexual regulation is a particularly clear example of the 
frequent divergence between the law on the books and in action. 
RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 3 (Univ. 
of Chicago Press 1996). 
 
119
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING: 1960 CENSUS (12 
Montana, Volume I Part 28, Table 7: Population of Counties, by Census County Divisions: 
1960-Con.), available at www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1960cenpopv1.html.  
Shelby had a population of 4,017.  Id.    
 
120
 The Complaint was filed on August 3, 1954.  Complaint, State v. Carroll, No. 577 (9th 
D. Mont. Aug. 3, 1954) (hereinafter Complaint).  A copy was ordered from the Toole County 
Clerk and is available and on file with the author.  On October 22, 1954, the trial court entered 
an order enjoining and abating the further use of the premises as a house of prostitution.  
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, State v. Carroll, No. 577 (9th D. Mont. Oct. 22, 
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That the said Viaduct Hotel has had the reputation for being a house of ill 
fame for the purposes of practicing of prostitution for more than one year 
last past, . . . and that the said Defendant Edna Carroll has the reputation 
of being the Lessee and Manager and conductress of said Viaduct Hotel 
and of the business conducted therein for more than two months last 
past.121 
This same W.M. Black, who was subsequently appointed to the bench, was the 
original trial court judge to which the Carroll v. Beardon case was assigned.122  He 
was disqualified pursuant to a motion filed by Ms. Carroll’s original attorney,123 and 
he was replaced by Judge LeRoy L. McKinnon of the Tenth Judicial Circuit who 
was “called in to assume” jurisdiction over the case.124  Although the case remained 
under Judge McKinnon's jurisdiction, Judge Black died in late 1962, while the case 
was on appeal before the Supreme Court of Montana, and was, in turn, replaced by 
Ronald D. McPhillips, who at the time of his appointment to the bench was the 
Toole County Attorney and had also worked in private practice with Ms. Carroll’s 
primary attorney, John C. Hoyt.125   
The cultural perspective of local law enforcement authorities may have rendered 
these officials more inclined to take action against someone running a house of 
prostitution located in a residential and commercial area within Shelby, as was the 
                                                          
1954) (hereinafter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law).  A copy of this order was also 
ordered from the Toole County Clerk and is available and on file with the author. 
 
121
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, supra note 120, at 2-3.  The Complaint states 
that the Viaduct Hotel was run as a house of prostitution “for more than one year last past.”  
Complaint, supra note 120, at 2.  The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contain this 
same language, but with lines typed through the words “one year” as if to strike them with the 
words “two months” typed immediately above the words “one year.”  Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, supra note 120, at 3.  Apparently, the court found the evidence 
established two months rather than one year as the relevant time frame. 
 
122
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 20.  
 
123
 Id. at 19.  In this Affidavit, Ms. Carroll’s attorney stated: 
That your affiant has good reason to believe and does believe that the above named 
Plaintiff cannot have a fair and impartial hearing or trial before the Honorable W.M. 
Black, Judge of the above entitled Court, who is about to preside at the trial in the 
above entitled case, by reason of the prejudice and bias of the said Judge. 
Id.  The reason for disqualification, quite clearly, is the fact that Judge Black prosecuted the 
abatement action against Ms. Carroll just one year and four months earlier.  See supra note 
120 and accompanying text.   
 
124
 Transcript, supra note 35, at 20. 
 
125
 SUPREME COURT OF MONT., SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MONTANA JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM (1989), available at  http://courts.mt.gov/content/annual_reports/1989rpt.pdf.  One of 
Ms. Beardon’s attorneys, Patrick Donovan, also served as the Toole County Attorney in the 
late 1950’s.  Id.  Patrick Donovan represented Ms. Carroll in the abatement action in 1954.  A 
court order dated November 8, 1954 granting Ms. Carroll an extension of time to file a bill of 
exceptions is available and on file with the author.  See also Obituary of Ronald Dale 
McPhillips, available at http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/greatfallstribune/obituary-
preview.aspx?n=ronald-d-mcphillips&pid=138218571&referrer=1630. 
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case with the Viaduct Hotel.126  The sole affidavit presented in support of the 
abatement action supports this theory as it was submitted by an individual who lived 
with his family in close proximity to the Viaduct Hotel and who also owned business 
property in this same location:  
Affiant further alleges that on various occasions certain men, unkown 
[sic] to Affiant, have, at night, called at his residence and place of 
business asking the question “Where are the girls kept”?  And otherwise 
molesting the peace and happiness of his home and family.  That Affiant 
alleges that said persons making such inquiry had mistaken his residence 
and place of business for the said Viaduct Hotel which said hotel is 
located at a short distance from the premises and property of Affiant.127  
Ms. Carroll very likely learned a lesson from this earlier experience and 
strategically chose to relocate her prostitution business to the Hillside Ranch, which 
was situated “on a road that ran past the local fairground about a mile east of the 
small [rural] city” and where she thereafter ran her prostitution business for four 
years without any interference by authorities.128   
Although the Supreme Court of Montana may have been unaware of the actions 
taken against Ms. Carroll for her activities at the Viaduct Hotel, the record and the 
majority opinion reveal that the court was aware of, and perhaps influenced by, the 
criminal justice system’s failure to prosecute either Ms. Carroll or Ms. Beardon for 
their activities at the Hillside Ranch, choosing “[i]n effect . . . to leave matters to the 
discretion of law enforcement officials,”129 the latter of whom apparently declined 
prosecution so long as the prostitution business remained quietly out of sight and 
separate from the larger community.130  The court’s majority opinion could also be 
interpreted as a statement that local law enforcement authorities were complicit in 
the illegal activities occurring at the Hillside Ranch, although the humorous, 
dismissive tenor of the opinion, and the court’s decision to enforce the contract, do 
not readily lend the opinion to such an interpretation.131 
Although there is no indication that the Supreme Court of Montana had 
knowledge of the nuisance action instituted against Ms. Carroll for her prostitution 
activities occurring at the Viaduct Hotel in 1954, the choice of local law enforcement 
to pursue a nuisance action132 rather than a criminal misdemeanor prosecution is 
                                                          
 
126
 See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 
127
 Affidavit by S. A. Hole, State v. Carroll, No. 577 (9th D. Mont. Aug. 3, 1954).  The 
Affidavit was ordered from the Toole County Clerk and is available and on file with the 
author. 
 
128
 MACAULAY, supra note 2, at 497.   
 
129
 Id. 
 
130
 See supra notes 118-120, 126-127 and accompanying text. 
 
131
 See supra notes 48, 59-63, 69-75 and accompanying text.     
 
132
 The Montana statute in effect at the time of the incidents giving rise to the lawsuit in 
Carroll v. Beardon provided as follows:  
Every building or place or tract of land under one ownership used for the purpose of 
lewdness, assignation, or prostitution, and every building or place or tract of land 
under one ownership wherein or upon which acts of lewdness, assignation, or 
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again a reflection of cultural values.133  This prosecutorial choice is, therefore, 
evidence of, if not a more tolerant attitude toward prostitution, an attitude that the 
offense did not constitute a serious moral or criminal wrong.134  The problem, 
however, with either judicial deference to local law enforcement or a judicial 
judgment of law enforcement complicity in the wrongdoing, is that it is misplaced.  
If the court’s role in this instance is to identify legislative intent regarding 
prostitution, the public policy underlying criminal and civil statutes regulating 
prostitution, and, in turn, to balance these public policy interests involved in a 
contract dispute, the decisions made by law enforcement authorities are not relevant 
to this assessment.135  Moreover, to the extent that the decisions of elected officials 
responsible for enforcing the laws represent the views of the larger culture within 
which the Supreme Court of Montana rendered its decision, such decisions should 
not be the court’s primary focus when applying the active participation test.136   
In fact, the undisputed and uninterrupted improper use of the premises by both 
parties, not just Ms. Beardon, the party attempting to evade contract enforcement, 
render the improper use defense stronger from a public policy perspective.  Such 
strong facts of continuous improper use by both parties to the contract suggest that 
the balance of equities tipped against contract enforcement because neither Ms. 
Carroll nor Ms. Beardon nor any individuals similarly situated would be less 
culpable or less in need of deterrence, and contract enforcement would directly 
implicate the court in the parties’ wrongdoing.137  As to deterrence, a no enforcement 
rule in these circumstances should also be economically efficient.138  Such 
                                                          
prostitution are held or occur, and any building, place or tract of land under one 
ownership wherein or upon which gambling or those other illegal acts prohibited by 
chapter 24 and chapter 30, Title 94 Revised Codes of Montana, 1947, are carried on or 
occurs, contrary to any of the laws of the state of Montana, or wherein any wine 
rooms are conducted or maintained, contrary to the laws of the state of Montana, or 
wherein any opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, and preparations thereof are 
sold or given away or used contrary to the laws of the state of Montana, is a nuisance 
which shall be enjoined, abated, and prevented as hereinafter provided, whether the 
same be a public or private nuisance. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-1002 (1947).  
 
133
 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 94-3608 (1947).  Moral views of crimes related to sex vary 
within the United States and this variation is reflected in different state laws: “So far as the 
regulation of sexual behavior is concerned, by crossing a state boundary one may be stepping 
into a different moral universe.”  POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 118, at 2. 
 
134
 Id.  See also supra notes 118-120, 126-127 and accompanying text. 
 
135
 See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
 
136
 See supra note 8 for an explanation as to why deference is made to legislators when 
statutory law governs.  
 
137
 For a presentation of the balance of interests employed by the courts, see supra notes 
108-12 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of the facts rendering Ms. Carroll and Ms. 
Beardon equally involved in the illegal use of the premises, see notes 39-42, 81-97 and 
accompanying text. 
 
138
 As one author explained, 
Efficient deterrence theory seeks to minimize the costs resulting from the 
nonenforcement of contracts.  When an illegal contract is not enforced, parties lose the 
 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2011
724 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:693 
 
uninterrupted improper use thus compares favorably to other contract situations 
readily found to violate public policy, such as: executory contracts to perform illegal 
or wrongful acts,139 contracts whose subject matter is intended to be used to commit 
a felony or an act involving “‘serious moral turpitude’ and ‘grave social harm,’”140 
                                                          
economic resources that they allocated to an activity calculated to maximize their 
respective self-interests.  It also is costly to society because resources spent to enter or 
even perform a contract that is of no effect could have been productively utilized 
elsewhere in the economy.  
Kostritsky, supra note 43, at 123.  “Because no clear benefit results when the loss is shifted 
from one equally guilty party to another, [as with Ms. Carroll and Ms. Beardon] it is more cost 
efficient to leave the parties where they are.”  Id. at 146. 
 
139
 An example of a contract to perform an illegal act would include a contract to sell a 
human organ.  Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of 
Contractual Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1545, 1610 & n.375 
(2006).  A contract involving performance of a wrongful act would include a contract to 
commit a tort.  Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate 
Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 
VA. L. REV. 1279, 1320 (2001).     
 
140
 Macintosh, supra note 15, at 1212.  Courts have never clearly defined “serious moral 
turpitude,” but many have distinguished between offenses that are malum prohibitum—
“unlawful by virtue of statute”—and those that are malum in se—morally wrong; “inherently 
evil.”  Transocean Enter., Inc. v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc., 33 So.3d 459, 467 (Miss. 2010).  
If a contract is deemed merely malum prohibitum, these courts may find it voidable and may 
order restitution.  Alex B. Long, Attorney-Client Fee Agreements that Offend Public Policy, 
61 S.C. L. REV. 287, 293-94 & n.51 (2009).  Restitution is generally unavailable if a contract 
is found to violate public policy.  Id. at 294.  A few courts have declared contracts involving 
prostitution immoral and presumptively void, but the majority of courts to consider the issue 
have narrowly construed the serious moral turpitude exception to exclude misdemeanor 
criminal activities such as those involved in Carroll v. Beardon, absent criminal or tortious 
conduct on the part of the seller or statutory prohibition of the contract itself.  The early cases 
in this area were cases involving treason or rebellion.  Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. 342 (1870).  
By virtue of this decision, the United States Supreme Court weighed in on the serious moral 
turpitude exception to contract enforcement more than 150 years ago, in a case involving a 
contract of supplies intended for the Confederate army, when it ruled that the contract was 
unenforceable:  
With whatever impunity a man may lend money or sell goods to another who he 
knows intends to devote them to a use that is only malum prohibitum, or of inferior 
criminality, he cannot do it, without turpitude, when he knows, or has every reason to 
believe, that such money or goods are to be used for the perpetration of a heinous 
crime, and that they were procured for that purpose.  
Id. at 346. 
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contracts whose subject matter's sole use is to commit a crime,141 or contracts 
expressly declared unenforceable by legislation.142   
To the extent the Supreme Court of Montana was not motivated as much by 
deference to local law enforcement decisions as it was by a conclusion that the 
contract resulted in no real harm to the public welfare, the court may have ignored an 
important externality and negative social cost to third parties caused by its 
enforcement of a clearly illegal contract.  In so doing it conveyed “a message that the 
state tolerates violation of positive law.”143  In affirming the trial court decision to 
enforce the contract, the Supreme Court of Montana not only sent a message of 
tolerance of illegal activity, but also directly implicated itself in the parties' 
wrongdoing, which was foreseeable to continue given the uninterrupted improper 
use of the premises from the time that Ms. Carroll initially purchased the property.144  
On remand, pursuant to the trial court’s earlier order, the property was sold for 
$20,000.00 at a public auction, to satisfy the judgment, to none other than Ms. 
Carroll, who happened to be the highest bidder.145  The court thereby awarded Ms. 
Carroll title to the property and also awarded her a deficiency judgment against Ms. 
Beardon in excess of $20,000.00.146  In the end, with the aid of both the trial court 
and the Supreme Court of Montana, Ms. Carroll gained economically from the 
transaction and the litigation and was placed in a position to once again carry on her 
prostitution business.147    
                                                          
 
141
 “Where the article sold is itself a device for the commission of an offense, designed 
solely for that purpose, the plaintiff by the mere sale of it has shared the guilt of the offense 
and cannot recover the price.”  J.E. Macy, Annotation Seller’s, Bailor’s, Lessor’s, or Lender’s 
Knowledge of the Other Party’s Intention to Put the Property or Money to an Illegal Use as 
Defense to Action for Purchase Price, Rent, or Loan, 166 A.L.R. 1353, 1360 (1947). 
 
142
 See supra note 43.  A simple example of a statutory prohibition would include a sale of 
alcohol “in a jurisdiction where the sale and purchase of alcoholic beverages is prohibited by 
statute.  If the seller later seeks to recover the purchase price . . . the buyer may assert that the 
contract is unenforceable because it directly violates a statute.”  Macintosh, supra note 15, at 
1200. 
 
143
 Badawi, supra note 7, at 507-08 (discussing “[t]he tension between the lack of harm 
posed by a particular contract and the aversion to failing to punish illegal conduct”).  
 
144
 For a discussion of the competing policy interests implicated in the improper use 
defense, see supra note 112 and accompanying text.  See also infra notes 146-53 and 
accompanying text. 
 
145
 She actually paid nothing to get the property back because the total judgment against 
Ms. Beardon, which included attorney’s fees as a part of the written contract, was $47,711.19 
($41,805.00 reflecting the balance due on the mortgage, $3,905.66 in interest, $2,000.00 in 
attorney’s fee, plus 6% interest to be added from the date of judgment).  Transcript, supra note 
35, at 24.  The auction was held on July 8, 1963 by Edwin Pierson, Sheriff of Toole County.  
Sheriff's Return on Foreclosure No. 8657 was obtained from the Toole County Clerk and is 
available and on file with the author.     
 
146
 The deficiency judgment was $27,711.19 plus interest accruing after judgment.  See 
Transcript, supra note 35, at 24.  A search of court records for the three-year period following 
the Supreme Court of Montana’s affirmance revealed no attempt by Ms. Carroll to collect this 
judgment.   
 
147
 Id.  See also supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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Ms. Carroll would have profited from the transaction with or without the aid of 
the Supreme Court of Montana's judgment enforcing the contract,148 but the court’s 
decision to enforce the contract was an affirmative decision that validated the sale of 
a prostitution business and thereby directly implicated the judiciary, and in fact, the 
highest court in the state of Montana, in the parties’ wrongdoing.149  In this manner, 
the court did not simply look the other way and fail to take action, as the local law 
enforcement authorities may have; instead the court, in declaring the contract 
enforceable, chose to legitimize and officially institutionalize the sex commerce 
business.150  To the extent that the court’s statement that because Ms. Beardon “had 
the benefit of the contract for several years . . . [h]er status naturally does not appeal 
to the favor of this court,”151 reflects a view that Ms. Beardon did not have clean 
hands, or that the parties were not in pari delicto,152 the better approach in the 
application of the active participation test would have been to deny enforcement of 
the contract and to craft an equitable remedy for Ms. Carroll.153   
                                                          
 
148
 She originally purchased the property for $6,000.00 (and perhaps significantly less 
money) and after some improvements, was actually paid by Ms. Beardon $9,000.00, which 
represents a 50% increase in a four-year period.  See supra notes 35-36, 83-84 and 
accompanying text. 
 
149
 See Badawi, supra note 7, at 507. 
 
150
 For a discussion of the harmful public policy effects of court enforcement of clearly 
illegal contracts, see supra note 143 and accompanying text.  See also BARBARA MEIL 
HOBSON, UNEASY VIRTUE 3, 215-16 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1990) (describing the sex 
commerce business as an institutionalized business in the United States).   
 
151
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 297 (Mont. 1963). 
 
152
 “In pari delicto means ‘of equal fault.’  The in pari delicto defense arose from the 
equitable maxim that one who seeks equitable relief must come into court with ‘clean hands.’”  
Mark Georg Strauch, Note, Rule 10b-5-Application of the In Pari Delicto Defense in Suits 
Brought Against Securities Brokers by Customers Who Have Traded on Inside Information, 
37 VAND. L. REV. 557, 561 (1984).  There are three reasons for the in pari delicto defense: 
First, since both parties are ‘equally at fault,’ the courts do not want to reward one 
party by allowing him to profit by the illegal act.  Second, courts feel that denying 
recovery will deter future illegal conduct.  Finally, the in pari delicto defense publicly 
affirms the court’s dissatisfaction with the plaintiff’s conduct. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 
153
 When courts deny enforcement of a contract based upon public policy, they sometimes 
deny all remedies, including standard contract damage remedies, rescission, restitution, and 
other equitable relief.  Levy v. Davis, 80 S.E. 791, 792 (Va. 1914).  
“As a general rule the law will leave all equally guilty of an illegal immoral 
transaction where it finds them, and will neither lend its aid to enforce the contract 
while executory, nor to rescind it and recover the consideration parted with when 
executed.  ‘It is a well settled principle of law that the courts will not aid a party to 
enforce an agreement made in furtherance of objects forbidden by the statute, or by 
common law, or general policy of law, or to recover damages for its breach, or when 
the agreement has been executed in whole or in part by payment of money to recover 
it back.’”   
Id. (quoting 2 ELLIOTT ON CONTRACTS § 1064).  “Courts are founded to execute the laws, and 
not to sanction or assist in their violation.”  Mitchell v. Campbell, 72 So. 231, 233 (Miss. 
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IV.  IMPROPER USE AND THE COURT’S DISREGARD OF EXISTING PRECEDENT 
At the time the Supreme Court of Montana issued its decision in Carroll v. 
Beardon, fourteen state supreme court decisions involving analogous facts had been 
rendered over a fifty-year timeframe beginning in the late nineteenth century and 
ending in the early twentieth century.154  This period leading up to the decision in 
                                                          
1916) (involving lease of premises used for prostitution).  As one author explained, this “no-
effect” rule, as it is often referred to, is couched in absolute language, but in actuality there are 
many exceptions for contracts found to violate public policy:  
Courts sometimes grant a one-sided voidability right, giving one party the option 
either to affirm or avoid his contractual obligations, but deny any relief to the other 
party.  Courts also may grant a one-sided enforcement right.  Additionally, in cases in 
which one party has partly performed, courts may grant a one-sided rescission right, 
plus restitution.  Finally, courts can deny enforcement but grant rescission to both 
parties.  Commentators have detailed the various qualifications to the no-effect rule 
without offering a comprehensive theory to explain why the exceptions exist and how 
they interrelate. 
Kostritsky, supra note 43, at 120-21.   
 
154
 The state supreme court decisions include the following: Belmont v. Jones House 
Furnishing Co., 125 S.W. 651, 652 (Ark. 1910) (holding a contract for sale of furniture for use 
in a house of prostitution enforceable where seller had knowledge of intended use, but “had no 
interest in the business”); Dougherty v. Seymour, 26 P. 823, 823 (Colo. 1891) (holding a lease 
of a house used for prostitution unenforceable where lessor knew of intended use); Jones v. 
Owens, 99 S.E. 121, 122 (Ga. 1919) (holding the sale of house to individual intending to use 
for prostitution unenforceable because seller’s knowledge of intended use rendered seller 
“participant in the immoral purposes” of buyer), overruled on other grounds by Stapler v. 
Anderson, 170 S.E. 498, 500 (Ga. 1933); Rosenblath v. Sanders, 91 So. 252, 253 (La. 1922) 
(holding a lease of house for prostitution void because lease “was entered into for the purpose 
of enabling the defendant to conduct a house of prostitution”); Berni v. Boyer, 97 N.W. 121, 
122 (Minn. 1903) (holding a lease of house used for prostitution void); Mitchell, 72 So. at 232 
(holding lease of premises by landlord of house used for prostitution “against public policy . . . 
against morality, and absolutely void”); Darling v. Kipp, 141 N.W. 830, 830 (Neb. 1913) 
(holding sale of goods to person running house of prostitution enforceable where seller had 
mere knowledge of buyer’s intended illegal use); Loose v. Larsen, 161 P. 514, 516 (Nev. 
1916) (holding sale of alcohol to person running house of prostitution enforceable where seller 
had mere knowledge of buyer’s intended use); Ernst v. Crosby, 35 N.E. 603, 604  (N.Y. 1893) 
(holding lease of premises used for prostitution unenforceable where lessor had knowledge of 
such use); Fineman v. Faulkner, 93 S.E. 384, 385 (N.C. 1917) (holding sale of “Edison talking 
machine” to prostitute enforceable where seller did not participate “in the illegal purpose of 
the purchaser”); Almy v. Greene, 13 R.I. 350, 352 (R.I. 1881) (holding knowledge by lessor 
that lessee intended to use premises for prostitution insufficient to invalidate contract); Reed 
v. Brewer, 37 S.W. 418, 420 (Tex. 1896) (holding that a knowing sale of furniture to person 
running house of prostitution unenforceable where seller also knew payments would be made 
from proceeds of prostitution); Levy, 80 S.E. at 792 (holding sale of goods to person running a 
house of prostitution unenforceable where seller knew only means of payment would come 
from prostitution business); Washington Liquor Co. v. Shaw, 80 P. 536, 537 (Wash. 1905) 
(holding a knowing sale of liquor to person running a house of prostitution enforceable if 
seller did not assist or participate in prostitution business).  In some jurisdictions, intermediate 
appellate court decisions had been rendered, but the issue had not been decided by the state 
supreme court.  See, e.g., Schankel v. Moffatt, 53 Ill. App. 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1893) (involving 
sale of household furniture, lease of premises, and sale of good will of house of prostitution by 
one prostitute to another prostitute).  In another intermediate appellate court decision, for 
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Carroll v. Beardon was followed by a forty-one year gap during which no state 
supreme court opinions were published addressing the improper use defense as 
applied to contracts involving prostitution.155  Because “judicial perceptions [of these 
policy-driven issues] are likely to change over time, in a loose synchronization with 
the developing attitudes and beliefs of society as a whole,”156 it would have been 
understandable had the Supreme Court of Montana rejected this entire body of 
precedent.  Instead, the Supreme Court of Montana chose to ignore this inconsistent 
and dated precedent rather than to articulate a more contemporary assessment of the 
competing public policy interests.157   
Recognition and assessment of this body of inconsistent precedent would have 
complicated the Supreme Court of Montana’s analysis, something the court clearly 
avoided even though the bulk of this precedent supported the court's decision to 
adopt a test requiring more than knowledge by a seller of a buyer's intended 
subsequent improper use to implicate the seller sufficiently to invalidate a 
contract.158  Although few courts explained their reasons for adopting this test, the 
courts that did offer an explanation concluded that to rule otherwise would render 
one party to a contract “the keeper of” the other party’s morals.159  Thus, in addition 
to knowledge, these courts, in conformity with the Supreme Court of Montana, 
uniformly required some participation, usually described as active participation, by 
the seller in the buyer’s subsequent illegal use of the property.160 
                                                          
example, the court addressed a situation very similar to the facts in the Carroll v. Beardon 
case when it ruled that the transaction was not enforceable because it involved the sale of an 
ongoing prostitution business, including its good will and was, therefore, “based on an illegal 
consideration.”  Finley v. Williamson, 215 S.W. 743, 746 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).     
 
155
 Id.  
 
156
 Macintosh, supra note 15, at 1212. 
 
157
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 296 (Mont. 1963).  The court was, or should have 
been, aware of this precedent given the fact that the parties cited to it and discussed it in the 
briefs they submitted on appeal.  See supra notes 70, 76-80, 106-07, 113-14 and 
accompanying text. 
 
158
 See HOBSON, supra note 150. 
 
159
  Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 (Mo. 1872) (involving contract for work on a house 
contractor knew to be used for gambling).  Judge Adams reasoned, “I am not aware of any 
principle of law which compels a merchant, laborer or mechanic to overlook the morals of his 
customers.  He is not the keeper of their morals in any sense of the word.”  Id. at 476.  
 
160
 See, e.g., Washington Liquor Co. v. Shaw, 80 P. 536, 537 (Wash. 1905).  The Supreme 
Court of Washington explained its holding as follows: 
“And it may be difficult to distinguish between the cases in which the vendor, with 
knowledge of the vendee’s unlawful purpose, does not become a confederate, and 
those wherein he aids and assists to an extent sufficient to vitiate the sale; but this 
difficulty is not apparent in the case at bar.”  We are therefore of opinion that, where 
property is sold absolutely and unconditionally, mere knowledge on the part of the 
vendor that the property will thereafter be sold illegally, or applied to some illegal or 
immoral use, will not bar an action to recover the purchase price, unless it is a part of 
the contract of sale that the property shall be so sold or used, or unless the vendor aids 
or participates in the illegal objects otherwise than by the mere act of making the sale. 
Id. (quoting Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n v. Mason, 46 N.W. 558, 559 (Minn. 1890)).     
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The difficulty for these courts was in developing a meaningful test or standard by 
which to draw the line between conduct or actions that directly connected the seller 
to the buyer’s illegal use of the property and those that were too remote or collateral 
to the subsequent use by the buyer.161  This difficulty is compounded by the fact that 
these same courts failed to articulate how the rules developed in the area of improper 
use furthered the relevant policy interests.162  Had the Supreme Court of Montana 
presented and evaluated this precedent, it may have directly confronted the 
uncertainty and potentially inconsistent resulting precedent inherent in an area of law 
in which courts are afforded a high degree of discretion as they balance vaguely 
defined competing public policy interests that shift and change as societal mores and 
values change.163 
The confused state of the law of improper use and public policy analysis relative 
to contracts involving prostitution can be traced to interpretation of nineteenth 
century British precedent, Pearce v. Brooks,164 a case the Supreme Court of Montana 
cited in its opinion, but failed to analyze.165  From the outset, some American courts 
rejected the analysis presented in the Pearce decision, and others, perhaps many, 
may have misinterpreted it.166  In this case, the plaintiff leased a specially designed 
                                                          
 
161
 Id. 
 
162
 Macintosh, supra note 15, at 1203. 
 
163
 See id.  The task is easier for courts when the legislature has spoken on the 
enforceability of contracts involving illegal activities.  See, e.g., Almy v. Greene, 13 R.I. 350, 
351 (R.I. 1881), in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island relied upon a statute providing 
in pertinent part:  
Whenever the lessee of a dwelling-house shall be convicted of keeping the same as a 
house of ill-fame, the lease or contract for letting such house shall, at the option of the 
lessor, become void; and such lessor shall thereupon have the like remedy to recover 
possession as against a tenant holding over after the expiration of his term. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted).  In Louisiana, a statute existed beginning in the late 
nineteenth century declaring void “‘all contracts having an immoral object.’”  Campbell v. 
Gullo, 78 So. 124, 125 (La. 1918).  One author has cautioned in the context of the improper 
use defense: 
In dealing with American precedents, care should be taken to eliminate any in which a 
statute has operated directly upon the transaction itself.  Often this fact does not 
appear in the report, and often the plaintiff’s knowledge may be the focus of inquiry 
under such a statute. . . . If, for example, the action is to recover the rent of premises 
let with knowledge that the tenant intended to use them for a gambling hall, a statute 
may have imposed a penalty upon any owner who “permits” his premises to be used 
for such a purpose.  The effect of this will have been to bring the case under the 
principle which nullifies illegal contracts, although the knowledge and intent of the 
plaintiff may be the nub of the controversy. 
Macy, supra note 141, at 1356-57.   
 
164
 Pearce v. Brooks, (1866) 1 L.R. Exch. 213. 
 
165
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 296 (Mont. 1963).  
 
166
 See, e.g., Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474 (Mo. 1872): 
The case of Pearce et al. v. Brooks, 1 Court of Ech. Law Rep. 213, so strongly relied 
on by defendants’ counsel as overruling the doctrine of previous English cases, does 
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miniature ornamental carriage to the defendant, a prostitute.167  When the defendant 
subsequently failed to pay a contractual forfeiture fee upon surrender of the carriage, 
the court ruled that the lessor-plaintiff could not enforce the contract due to the 
lessor’s knowledge at the time of entry into the contract that the defendant was a 
prostitute;168 some members of the court argued that this knowledge also included a 
requirement that the lessor know the defendant intended to use the carriage as a part 
of her illegal and immoral purpose—to display herself in order to attract 
customers,169 while other members argued that the knowledge requirement included 
awareness by the lessor of the fact that the defendant would fulfill her contractual 
obligations from the proceeds of prostitution.170    
This British decision was relied upon by a handful of early American courts that 
found mere knowledge by a seller or lender of a buyer’s intended subsequent illegal 
use of property sufficient to invalidate a contract.171  Other American courts either 
rejected this reasoning, finding mere knowledge insufficient to connect the seller or 
lessor to the buyer or lessee’s subsequent improper or illegal use,172 or interpreted 
Pearce as involving unique facts regarding the subject matter of the contract 
rendering it distinguishable from many superficially similar contracts.173  These latter 
courts, which came to encompass a majority, found the fact that the carriage in 
Pearce was actually used to facilitate prostitution outcome determinative:174   
                                                          
not in terms profess to do so.  The point made in that case was that a man who hired a 
brougham to a prostitute, knowing that she was a prostitute, and knowing that she 
intended to use the brougham for purposes of display and attraction, could not recover 
for the hire, because such knowledge in that case amounted to an intention or design 
on his part to aid the prostitute in her illegal calling.  The Court of Exchequer does not 
profess to overrule the previous cases, but by a sort of hairsplitting distinction to agree 
with them.  We doubt whether the point was properly ruled in that case, and we 
therefore disregard it as any authority here. 
Id. at 476-77.  See also Macy, supra note 141, at 1359 (noting that Pearce “has not been 
clearly understood in America”). 
 
167
 Pearce, 1 L.R. Exch. at 214. 
 
168
 Id. 
 
169
 Id.  
 
170
 Id.  
 
171
 See Macy, supra note 141, at 1356 (asserting that “[t]he American courts long ago 
stopped discussing the English decisions” in the area of improper use contracts). 
 
172
 Bishop v. Honey, 34 Tex. 245, 252 (Tex. 1870) (finding mere knowledge by mechanic 
of buyer’s intent to use premises for prostitution insufficient to invalidate contract where 
house was to be paid for “as the work progressed,” not out of prostitution business proceeds); 
Schankel v. Moffatt, 53 Ill. App. 382, 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 1893) (concluding that “[a] contract 
which is in itself legitimate is not void because the beneficiary thereof knows that the other 
party intends to use the subject-matter to aid him in violating the law”).    
 
173
 Michael v. Bacon, 49 Mo. 474, 477 (Mo. 1872) (distinguishing Pearce as involving a 
situation in which the subject matter of the contract aided “the prostitute in her illegal 
calling”).     
 
174
 St. Louis Fair Ass’n v. Carmody, 52 S.W. 365, 368 (Mo. 1899).  See also Martin v. 
Wade, 37 Cal. 168, 171 (Cal. 1869) (commenting in a case not involving prostitution that 
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[I]n some sense, everything which was supplied to a prostitute is supplied 
to her to enable her to carry on her trade, as, for instance, shoes sold to a 
street walker; and that the things supplied must be not merely such as 
would be necessary or useful for ordinary purposes, and might be also 
applied to an immoral one; but that they must be such as would under the 
circumstances not be required, except with that view.  The jury, by the 
mode in which they answered the question, shewed that they appreciated 
the distinction; and on reflection I think they were entitled to draw the 
inference which they did.  They were entitled to bring their knowledge of 
the world to bear upon the facts proved.  The inference that a prostitute . . 
. required an ornamental brougham for the purposes of her calling, was as 
natural a one as that a medical man would want a brougham for the 
purpose of visiting patients; and the knowledge of the defendant’s 
condition being brought home to the plaintiffs, the jury were entitled to 
ascribe to them also the knowledge of her purpose. 175  
Based upon this reasoning, the majority of American courts to address the issue 
have routinely enforced contracts for the sale of alcohol, furniture, and other items of 
personal property to be used as a part of conducting a house of prostitution when, at 
the time of entry into the contract, the seller knew of the buyer’s intended use, but 
had no involvement in the subsequent illegal activity or use of the property.176  These 
courts have found the seller or lessor too remotely connected to the illegal activity to 
be deemed an active participant in the buyer’s or tenant’s subsequent illegal 
activity.177   
                                                          
“recovery cannot be had for supplying clothing or lodgings to a prostitute for the purpose of 
enabling her to ply her vocation”). 
 
175
 Pearce, 1 L.R. Exch. at 215. 
 
176
 One court commented: 
The plaintiff was a retail dealer in furniture at Alliance.  He sold these articles in the 
regular course of his business.  He had no interest in the defendant’s business and was 
in no way connected with it.  There seems to be no reason for holding him responsible 
for her business, any more than one who should sell her groceries, fuel, wearing 
apparel, or any such like articles. Under such circumstances, he is not particeps 
criminis, and was entitled to recover for the goods sold. 
Darling v. Kipp, 141 N.W. 830, 830 (Neb. 1913).    
 
177
 This has been the case even when one prostitute has sold goods to another prostitute.  
Schankel, 53 Ill. App. at 382.  See also Hayes v. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co., 180 S.W. 149, 
152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915), a case in which the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas reversed a 
trial court judgment that a contract was unenforceable based upon facts found by the jury: 
We have reviewed a great number of cases, and, while they are not all agreed as to 
what facts are necessary to render a claim founded on an immoral consideration 
uncollectible through the courts, they are in harmony on the proposition that, where a 
transaction is had with knowledge, purpose, and effect to aid another in the 
commission of an unlawful act, a consideration founded upon such transaction cannot 
be enforced.  
Id.  But see Ham v. Wilson, 86 So. 298, 298-99 (Miss. 1920), a case in which the sellers 
simply knew that the goods were purchased to furnish a house of prostitution.  One of the 
sellers was the mayor of the town “and after a large part of the purchase price had been paid 
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When a lessor, however, retained a reversionary interest in leased premises, some 
courts were more inclined to find the lessor implicated in a tenant’s business use of 
the premises as a house of prostitution even in the face of negligible evidence that 
the landlord was involved in any way in the prostitution business.178  These courts 
appear to more readily find that the landlord was interested in the subsequent 
business use by the tenant than were sellers of real estate given the fact that rent was 
paid on an ongoing basis from the proceeds of this illegal use and the landlord 
thereby directly gained from the illegal activity.179  Some courts found crucial to the 
landlord’s involvement the assumption that the consideration, the value of the rent, 
had been negotiated at a higher rate based upon the property’s value as an ongoing 
illegal enterprise and the corresponding risks associated with illegal activity:180   
[I]t is the opinion of this court, that rent should not be recovered for a 
house knowingly let to a person who will use it, or who does use it, for 
the depraved and immoral purposes of prostitution.  It is not a question of 
whether women of this unfortunate class should be deprived of the shelter 
of a roof, as counsel puts it, but a question of whether a court will enforce 
a contract founded upon a vicious and degraded occupation, and from 
which must spring the consideration of a contract.181 
                                                          
the mayor issued an order compelling the defendant and all others of her kind to close up their 
houses and leave town.”  Id. at 298.  The buyers were unable to pay the balance remaining due 
on the goods and could not remove the goods without the sellers’ consent, which was not 
given.  Id.  The court refused to “lend its aid to such immoral and unholy transactions” and 
held the contract unenforceable.  Id. at 299.     
 
178
 See, e.g., Almy v. Greene, 13 R.I. 350, 352 (R.I. 1881) (statutory provision intending to 
benefit lessor by declaring that lessor has right to have lease contracts declared void when 
premises used for prostitution effective unless lessor “has been cognizant of the illegal use and 
has consented to it”).  See also Ernst v. Crosby, 35 N.E. 603, 604 (N.Y. 1893) (finding that 
purchaser of premises subject to a lease could not enforce lease when purchaser “had the 
opportunity to ascertain about the lease and the use by the lessee”). 
 
179
 For the application of this same concept in the context of personal property, see 
Standard Furniture Co. v. Van Alstine, 62 P. 145, 146 (Wash. 1900) (involving a sale of 
property in which the seller retained control and use of property: the seller “not only reserved 
‘title, ownership, and possession of the property,’ but reserved the right to ‘take possession of 
the aforesaid personal property whenever it may deem itself insecure, even before the 
maturity’ of the deferred payments”).   
 
180
 Hunstock v. Palmer, 23 S.W. 294, 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893) (citing as an example of 
an unenforceable contract one in which “‘A assigned to B his lease of a house, knowing that 
he intended to use it as a brothel, receiving from him an excessive rent, which was to be paid 
out of the profits of the place’”).  See also Ashbrook v. Dale, 27 Mo. App. 649, 653 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1887) (citing to evidence in the record “that the rental value of the premises, for 
legitimate purposes, was from thirty to forty dollars per month, while its rental value, as a 
house of prostitution, was seventy dollars (the difference in rent arising, presumptively, from 
the risk[s] . . . attending illegal tenancies)”). 
 
181
 Hunstock, 23 S.W. at 295.  Some courts have treated cases involving leasehold interests 
no differently than those involving the sale of real estate and have consequently required more 
active participation by the landlord in the subsequent illegal use of the property before 
invalidating the contract.  Almy, 13 R.I. at 350.  See also Kessler v. Pearson, 55 S.E. 963, 964 
(Ga. 1906) (concluding that “only when the landlord aids or abets the tenant in the unlawful 
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The problem has been not with an active participation requirement, but rather 
with how the courts measure the seller’s participation.182  Some courts have taken an 
intent-based approach, assessing whether the seller intended at the time of entry into 
the contract to further the buyer’s illegal purpose.183  An intent-based approach is 
problematic for several reasons.  First, courts invoking this test of seller participation 
focused on the seller’s intent, but these same courts appear to have conflated the 
buyer’s and seller’s intent, treating the intent requirement as a shared purpose.184  
Second, even if the courts in these situations were truly measuring the seller’s intent 
at the time of entry into the contract, the seller’s intent, assumption, or even hope, 
regarding the buyer’s future conduct is simply irrelevant to the buyer’s subsequent 
use of the property.185  Stated another way, a seller’s intent regarding a buyer’s use 
of the property, standing alone, would not in any way constrain the buyer’s 
subsequent actions and, therefore, should not serve as the sole test of contract 
invalidity.186   
Other courts appear to have adopted a more coherent approach through their 
assessment of the seller’s intent and actions as alternative reasons for denying 
contract enforcement: A contract was not enforced if the seller knew of the buyer’s 
intended illegal use of the property and if the seller either participated in the buyer’s 
illegal purpose or acted to further that purpose.187  When the cases are closely 
analyzed, these latter courts appear to have focused not upon the seller’s intent, but 
rather upon the seller’s direct gain from or direct participation in the buyer’s 
                                                          
enterprise, or by some affirmative act gives his consent and approbation to the tenant’s 
maintaining a brothel, that he shares the tenant’s guilt”).  
 
182
 As one author explained, “[t]he traditional rules draw a sharp distinction between mere 
knowledge of an improper use and active participation in the improper use.”  Macintosh, 
supra note 15, at 1201.  “When a person not only knowingly supplies property, money, or 
services, but also takes further steps to assist the customer’s improper use, he will not be 
permitted to enforce the contract.”  Id.  For an example of this vaguely stated standard, see 
Standard Furniture Co., 62 P. at 146: 
[I]f the vendor has knowledge of the immoral or illegal design of the vendee,  and in 
any way aids or participates in that design, or if the contract of sale is so connected 
with the illegal or immoral purpose or transaction of the vendee as to be inseparable 
from it, the vendor cannot recover. 
 
183
 “As hard as it may be to distinguish mere knowledge from participation, some courts 
draw an even more difficult distinction by granting enforcement when the supplier knows of 
the improper use but is indifferent to it, and denying enforcement when the supplier not only 
knows of the improper use, but also acts for the purpose of furthering it.”  Macintosh, supra 
note 15, at 1202 (emphasis added). 
 
184
 Given the fact that the distinction between knowledge and intent is murky, a finder of 
fact may “achieve whichever outcome it desires through conclusory characterization of . . . 
mental state.”  Macintosh, supra note 15, at 1202.     
 
185
 That is, particularly in the context of a sale where the seller relinquishes control of the 
subject matter, the buyer can choose to use the property in a legal manner.  For a discussion of 
the distinction between absolute and conditional sale in the context of the public policy 
defense, see Standard Furniture Co., 62 P. at 146.   
 
186
 See id. 
 
187
 See supra notes 179, 182, and 184.  See also Macy, supra note 141, at 1384-86.     
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subsequent illegal use of the property as measured by, for example, the 
consideration—a higher rental rate or purchase price representing the monetary 
value of the illegal use.188  Active participation was found by these courts when the 
seller was actually involved in some way in the subsequent prostitution activity of 
the buyer or tenant,189 when the seller instigated the buyer to use the property for 
prostitution,190 when the seller acquired a monetary interest in the buyer’s 
prostitution business,191 or when the seller assisted the buyer in evading detection.192      
                                                          
 
188
 See supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text. 
 
189
 Such involvement has been found under the following circumstances: 
We are of the opinion that from the facts: (1) That so large an amount of furniture was 
sold by Erastus Reed to defendant on open account, apparently without security, with 
the knowledge on his part of the very purpose for which it was to be used and that the 
money to pay for same “had to come out of prostitution;” (2) that the payments were 
to be made weekly or monthly in such small sums as defendant might be able to 
realize from such business, conducted with the aid of the furniture, extending over a 
number of years; (3) that thereafter defendant, ‘at the request of Erastus Reed, and in 
order to enable him to raise money at the bank,’ executed the notes and the instrument 
securing same; (4) that said instrument provided that until all the money was paid the 
title to the furniture was to remain solely in Reed, defendant to retain possession, but 
not to remove same from the house of prostitution, where it then was being illegally 
used, nor sell same; the trial court might properly have found not only that Erastus 
Reed sold the furniture to defendant knowing that she was to use it for the purpose of 
putting up and carrying on a house of prostitution and that his pay must come from the 
revenues derived therefrom, but also that Erastus Reed, at the time of the sale 
contemplated, and subsequently was actually aiding and abetting her in the venture. 
Reed v. Brewer, 37 S.W. 418, 420 (Tex. 1896). 
 
190
 Instigation has been found when the evidence established that the seller of furniture 
“instigated the defendant to buy the property for the avowed purpose of using it in a house of 
prostitution, and advised the defendant to enlarge the profits of the business by increasing the 
number of wretched victims of their avarice and doom them to a life of infamy.”  Levy v. 
Davis, 80 S.E. 791, 793 (Va. 1914).  
 
191
 Such an interest has been found when a seller expects to receive mortgage payments 
from “the proceeds of the avocation of conducting a bawdyhouse or brothel.”  Finley v. 
Williamson, 215 S.W. 743, 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919). 
 
192
 In the improper use context involving prostitution, such cases are rare and involve 
strong facts of seller participation: 
Price held out certain inducements to her, assuring her that there had been a change in 
the police force and that she would likely do a good business on Oakley street; that 
Price rented her part of the furniture which he had before that time rented to Flora 
Campbell when she was in the house; and that he also employed the services of a 
negro to build a “trap” in the house under which she might conceal beer from the 
officers of the law.  Some of the statements of the witness were denied by George C. 
Price; but this witness, himself several times convicted upon a charge of selling 
intoxicating liquor, virtually admits that he knew the purpose of the tenant and the use 
to which she expected to put the property and the assistance which he rendered in 
providing the “trap” to conceal the beer.  In other words, the proof justifies the 
conclusion that the agent not only had knowledge of the fact that Blanche Campbell 
was a common prostitute, but that she intended to use the very premises here leased as 
a bawdy house and a “blind tiger.” 
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Had the Supreme Court of Montana invoked any of these approaches to 
measuring seller participation, Ms. Carroll should have been found an active 
participant in Ms. Beardon’s illegal use of the premises.  First, her own words 
establish an understanding that the premises would be used solely for prostitution, 
and because such use was necessary to enable Ms. Beardon to pay the mortgage, Ms. 
Carroll understood that without this criminal use, there would be no contract.193  The 
strongest evidence of intent in this case is the consideration or values exchanged—
the price term, which was so clearly out of proportion to the price a legitimate use 
would support, reflects Ms. Carroll’s intent to sell an ongoing prostitution business, 
complete with payment terms that were linked to seasonal fluctuations in demand.194  
Stated another way, Ms. Carroll’s direct gain from Ms. Beardon’s criminal use of the 
premises is evidenced by the purchase price.195  Ms. Carroll’s actual or active 
participation in Ms. Beardon’s improper use arguably also stems from this payment 
structure which enabled Ms. Beardon to engage in the prostitution business and pay 
the mortgage.  Given the overwhelming evidence that the contract’s sole purpose 
was to facilitate prostitution, it is difficult to understand the Supreme Court of 
Montana’s statement requiring Ms. Beardon to “show more active participation by 
the seller than has been shown here.”196      
V.  EPILOGUE TO CARROLL V. BEARDON AND THE IMPROPER USE DEFENSE 
The opinion has proved to be of very little value to future courts and litigants, 
representing a failure by the Supreme Court of Montana in one of its primary duties: 
the duty to create, interpret, and dispense the law.197  In fact, the case has been cited 
on only one occasion by the Supreme Court of Montana, occurring almost twenty-
five years after the court initially issued the Carroll v. Beardon decision.198  In this 
subsequent decision, the Supreme Court of Montana was explicit in its description of 
the contract in Carroll v. Beardon as violating public policy, but due to the 
relationship of the parties, permitting the court to enforce the contract: “Montana 
cases have established that under certain circumstances a plaintiff may pursue a 
                                                          
Mitchell v. Campbell, 72 So. 231, 232 (Miss. 1916). 
 
193
 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
 
194
 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text. 
 
195
 For a discussion as to how the payment terms provide evidence that the contract 
involved the sale of a prostitution business, see supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
 
196
 Carroll v. Beardon, 381 P.2d 295, 297 (Mont. 1963). 
 
197
 See supra note 104.   
 
198
 Powder River Cnty. Bank v. Arness-McGriffin Coal Co., 732 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Mont. 
1987).  The case involved an illegal loan agreement pursuant to state statutory law limiting 
loans to partnerships and corporations for “20% of the amount of the unimpaired capital and 
surplus of that bank.”  Id. at 1328.  The Supreme Court of Montana rejected the company’s 
argument that it was not in pari delicto with the bank and should, therefore, be permitted to 
pursue an action against the bank.  Id. at 1329.  The court relied on the policy underlying the 
legislation—the protection of “depositors of a bank”—and concluded that “[t]o allow 
appellant to pursue his claims against the Bank would circumvent that public policy.”  Id. at 
1330.        
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claim based on an illegal contract where the plaintiff is not in pari delicto.”199  The 
Court then cautioned, in classic form used to overrule by implication, that the 
Carroll v. Beardon case was limited to “very particular situations and specific illegal 
contracts.”200   
The Supreme Court of Montana not only failed in its duties to the parties, to their 
attorneys, and to the public, but it also missed an opportunity to craft law in an area 
in which no state supreme court had spoken in more than forty years about the active 
participation test in the context of improper use and contracts involving 
prostitution.201  Although the precise issue has not been presented to the Supreme 
Court of Montana202 or another high court since the decision in Carroll v. Beardon, 
relevant cases arise in a variety of contemporary contexts, including, for example, 
lawsuits filed to recover expenditures made in establishing and running “an escort 
and dating service” which operated as a prostitution business.203  Other related, more 
                                                          
 
199
 Id. at 1329.  Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court of Montana explicitly 
concluded that Ms. Beardon and Ms. Carroll were not equally at fault and neither explained 
how the facts supported such a conclusion.  See supra notes 111, 152.   
 
200
 Id.  The Supreme Court of Montana could not have more clearly limited the Carroll v. 
Beardon decision to its facts, “a method of overruling it” without saying so.  Gregory C. 
Cook, Note, Footnote 6: Justice Scalia’s Attempt to Impose a Rule of Law on Substantive Due 
Process, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 853, 884-85 n.166 (1991).  See also Chad Flanders, 
Please Don’t Cite This Case! The Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore, 116 YALE L.J. (Pocket 
Part) 141, 142 (2006) (commenting that when the United States Supreme Court limits a case 
to its facts, “it is on the way to overruling it, by nullifying the principle that decided the 
case”).   
 
201
 See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
 
202
 The Supreme Court of Montana has been called upon to resolve issues involving quid 
pro quo claims of sexual harassment under state statutory law and involving the intersection 
of contract law and prostitution.  See, e.g., Schmidt v. Cook, 108 P.3d 511, 515-16 (Mont. 
2005).  In this case, the defendant, Elvin Cook, advertised for a “Live in Maid” to work at a 
hotel he managed.  Id. at 512.  The plaintiff, Nina Schmidt, “an emancipated sixteen-year-old” 
interviewed for the position.  Id.  During the interview, which occurred in a motel room, 
Elvin stripped his bed and asked Schmidt to remake it to demonstrate that she could 
make a bed.  After she did so, Schmidt testified, Elvin informed her that she was hired 
for the maid position.  Elvin then informed Schmidt that as part of her job, she would 
be required to have sex with him and with Motel customers.  He described in detail a 
variety of sexual acts that Schmidt would be required to perform.  He told her that she 
might eventually make $20,000 to $40,000 per month.  
Id.  The issue presented to the Supreme Court of Montana in this case involved a question as 
to whether “the parties operated in pari delicto.”  Id. at 515. 
 
203
 Youshah v. Staudinger, 604 N.Y.S.2d 479, 479 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (finding plaintiff’s 
claim for $27,752.34 for renting and furnishing apartments in Manhattan and for placing 
advertisements to hire “personnel” illegal and unenforceable).  In another case, a Florida 
appellate court reviewed a lower court order compelling discovery of a plaintiff’s alleged 
history of prostitution and money earned from such activity.  Balas v. Ruzzo, 22 Fla. L. 
Weekly 2375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).  The lawsuit was filed against “a leisure spa,” which 
allegedly operated as a house of prostitution, by two former employees who alleged they were 
coerced into prostitution.  Id.  Pursuant to Florida statutory law, a person coerced into 
prostitution has a “cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages.”  Id. (citing FLA. 
STAT. § 796.091(1)).  Individuals have sued alleging tort-based theories of recovery.  See, e.g., 
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frequently litigated, disputes include lawsuits to enforce contracts to provide 
financial support in the context of unmarried cohabitation or intimate 
relationships.204  If the Supreme Court of Montana had been as confident about the 
larger social and political culture within which it operated, as the Carroll v. Beardon 
opinion appears to indicate, it could have taken a leadership role in approaching the 
regulation of these contemporary contract claims.205   
                                                          
Peoples v. Dayle, 16 Pa. D. & C.5th 85, 86 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2010).  In this case, a plaintiff, who 
was blind, alleged that the defendant, whom he hired for sex, allegedly “had him sign credit 
card receipts with the wrong amount on them exceeding $3,000 in fraudulent charges.”  Id.  
The court denied his claims based on theories of “common-law theft, theft by deception and 
conversion, common-law fraud, Pennsylvania statutory consumer fraud and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress” finding the transactions illegal.  Id.  In another case, a former 
wife filed a lawsuit against her former husband for “intentional and negligent conduct” in 
infecting her with the herpes virus when they, “shortly before the marriage . . . ‘engaged in 
consensual sexual intercourse.’”  Zysk v. Zysk, 404 S.E.2d 721, 721 (Va. 1990).  The 
Supreme Court of Virginia held that because the sexual activity occurred prior to marriage, it 
amounted to illegal fornication under statutory law and such illegal conduct could not form 
the basis for a tort claim.  Id. at 722.    
 
204
 Courts are not in agreement on this issue.  See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 
305 (Wis. 1987) (finding plaintiff stated a claim based upon an express or implied in fact 
contract for “property accumulated during their nonmarital cohabitation relationship which 
spanned 12 years and produced two children”).  But see Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 
1211 (Ill. 1979) (finding on similar facts that such claims “contravene the public policy, 
implicit in the statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 
disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried 
cohabitants”).  In another case, a court denied a plaintiff’s attempt to retain money given to 
her in contemplation of a future marriage when the subsequent marriage failed to occur 
because the relationship began when the woman was married to another man.  Taylor v. Frost, 
276 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Neb. 1979).  The Supreme Court of Nebraska explained its decision as 
follows: 
As we have noted, Phyllis, while still married, claims to have made a contract of 
prostitution in order to gain a house.  Such contracts by a married person are also 
contrary to the public policy which is designed to protect marriage, as well as the 
legislative public policy making prostitution illegal.  If we were to hold that the “clean 
hands” maxim enables one in her claimed position to keep her “illegal” gains, then 
that would also tend to interfere with the marriage relationship and might promote 
fraud. 
Id. at 659.  Claims have also been made upon an alleged oral contract to provide financial 
support in exchange for sexual services: 
Despite the attempt by plaintiff, an admitted prostitute, to characterize her claims for 
breach of contract and promissory estoppel against the individual defendant as being 
premised on her provision of services other than and distinct from sexual relations, the 
record discloses that the association between the parties was one founded upon the 
exchange of money for sex.   It is well settled that an agreement for financial support 
in exchange for illicit sexual relations is violative of public policy and thus 
unenforceable. 
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 740 N.Y.S.2d 341, 342 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002). 
 
205
 See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. 
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Rather than omitting facts and distorting the record, the Supreme Court of 
Montana should have remanded the case to the trial court, which failed to even 
mention, much less consider, the public policy defense to contract enforcement 
raised by Ms. Beardon.206  The court should have directed the trial court on remand 
to assess the overwhelming evidence showing that the transaction involved the sale 
of an ongoing prostitution business.207  Rather than directing the lower court to apply 
an outmoded, ill-fitting active participation test to the contract defense, the Supreme 
Court of Montana, with whom rested the ultimate authority as to the applicable 
law,208 could have, for example, declared that the appropriate test of contract 
enforceability in these situations turned on prevailing local cultural views of the 
prostitution scenario presented by the facts—the sale and continued operation of a 
brothel located in a rural area.  The parties would have then been permitted the 
opportunity on remand to introduce evidence as to whether there existed a prevailing 
cultural view of indifference or tolerance on the matter.209  If the evidence satisfied 
the trial court that such a view existed or if the fact was “of general notoriety” and 
“not subject to reasonable dispute,” the trial court would be entitled to take judicial 
notice of such cultural facts and enforce the contract.210  
                                                          
 
206
 See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.  The public policy defense to contract 
enforcement “is an affirmative defense and as with other affirmative defenses, the defendant 
who pleads it has the burden of proving it by a preponderance of the evidence.”  A Better 
Place, Inc. v. Giani Inv. Co., 445 So. 2d 728, 732 (La. 1984).  Ms. Beardon raised the public 
policy defense in her answer to the complaint and as a basis of appeal.  She, therefore, 
preserved the defense.  See Transcript, supra note 35, at 9-10. 
 
207
 See supra notes 40-42, 82-97 and accompanying text. 
 
208
 John D. Echeverria, Stop the Beach Renourishment: Why the Judiciary is Different, 35 
VT. L. REV. 475, 491 (2010) (explaining that “‘[a] State’s highest court is unquestionably the 
ultimate exposito[r] of state law’”) (quoting Riley v. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 1970, 1985 (2008) 
(quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975))).  
 
209
 Pursuant to prevailing law, the Supreme Court of Montana was permitted to “take 
judicial notice of any matter of which the court of original jurisdiction” could take notice and 
could do so sua sponte without notice to the parties and without providing an opportunity for 
the parties to be heard.  Holtz v. Babcock, 390 P.2d 801, 802-03 (Mont. 1964) (quoting 20 
AM. JUR. Evidence § 27).  Montana adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence in July, 1977, 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-100, including Rule 201.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-201; see 
also FED. R. EVID. 201.  The court was not, however, permitted to take judicial notice on 
appeal of facts because such facts were considered evidentiary matters which an appellate 
court was empowered to review only after initial consideration by the trial court.  Holtz, 390 
P.2d at 803.  As the Holtz court explained, 
“In the event a party relies on the judicial knowledge of the trial judge as to local 
conditions, he must in some form procure that knowledge to be brought into the 
record, so that an appellate court may rely thereupon, for the general rule is that if the 
attention of the trial court is not called to a fact within its judicial knowledge and such 
fact is not judicially noticed, the appellate court will not take judicial notice of it.” 
Id. at 802 (quoting 20 AM. JUR. § 21).  
 
210
 MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-201, Commission Comments (describing Montana statutory 
and judicial interpretation of judicial notice doctrine consistent with standard of Federal Rule 
201). 
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Had the Supreme Court of Montana taken this novel approach and invoked the 
judicial notice doctrine, it would not have found itself in the untenable position of 
misstating and omitting facts from the record to create a case that did not exist in 
order to reach the result it deemed appropriate.  The judicial notice doctrine is 
particularly appropriate to this common law defense to contract enforcement because 
it    
derives from the reality that all social institutions—including the courts—
must be run by humans who are a part of the culture served by those 
courts.  The complex dynamics of a culture’s entire fabric of shared 
values, its learning and lore, its social and professional networks, political 
allegiances, general normative standards and customs, are integral to a 
judge who is both cocooned within the culture while also serving in the 
most pivotal role of its system of justice.211 
There is also precedential support for a court to take judicial notice of a wide 
range of facts including facts related to “human life, health, habits, customs and 
usages as well as sociological matters.”212  In specific cases, courts and judges have 
taken judicial notice of local culture and history.213   
                                                          
 
211
 Bruce W. Burton, The “O.K. Corral Principle” in the Age of Terrorism: Proposed New 
Protocols for Judicial Notice in Cases of Alleged Misconduct by Law Enforcement, 41 IDAHO 
L. REV. 85, 123 (2004); Bruce W. Burton, The “O.K. Corral Principle”: Finding the Proper 
Role for Judicial Notice in Police Misconduct Matters, N.M. L. REV. 301, 316 (1999).   
 
212
 GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 
201.9 (4th ed. 2001) (hereinafter WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE).  The Supreme Court 
of Montana has taken judicial notice of the following: “[t]he tremendous loss of life and injury 
occurring daily from the operation of automobiles on our highways,” State v. Bosch, 242 P.2d 
477, 482 (Mont. 1952), “the fact that vodka is an ‘intoxicating liquor,’” State v. Moore, 357 
P.2d 346, 348 (Mont. 1960), and “‘that cattle range widely, paying no attention to county [as 
in this case] or state lines,’” State v. Elmore, 247 P.2d 488, 492 (Mont. 1952) (quoting State v. 
Keeland, 104 P. 513, 517 (Mont. 1909)).   
 
213
 See, e.g., Anita Cava, Taking Judicial Notice of Sexual Stereotyping, 43 ARK. L. REV. 
27, 40 (1990) (arguing that courts “border on taking judicial notice of the cultural 
phenomenon,” of sex stereotyping because they do not require proof); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 
682 P.2d 524, 533 (Idaho 1984) (taking judicial notice of social and economic connections 
within a state); McQueen v. Fayette Cnty. Sch. Corp., 711 N.E.2d 62, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) 
(Kirsch, J., dissenting) (advocating for judicial notice of the role of a particular sporting event 
“in the culture, history and persona” of a state); In re Guardianship of Ashley Elizabeth R., 
863 P.2d 451, 455 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (taking judicial notice of the “very significant 
cultural presence of the [Navajo] Tribe” in a community); Creative Rests., Inc., v. Memphis, 
795 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (taking judicial notice of “a cultural and historical 
reputation nationwide” of an area within a city); Gilbert v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 91, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (taking judicial notice of “‘the growing and insatiable media 
culture in society whereby tremendous efforts are taken to obtain a[nd] publish very private 
information about people in general, and celebrities in particular’”) (quoting trial court order); 
Amana Soc’y v. Colony Inn, Inc., 315 N.W.2d 101, 118 (Iowa 1982) (Supreme Court of Iowa 
taking “judicial notice of the extraordinary historic, cultural, and architectural value” of area).  
In an action by a landlord against a tenant to terminate occupancy so that a building could be 
demolished for construction of an art museum, the New York City Municipal Court found: 
The court takes judicial notice that New York City is one of the world’s great centers 
of art, music, culture and entertainment.  The area where the instant property is 
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Courts also take judicial notice of legislative facts:214 
This involves the court taking judicial notice of matters of public policy, 
criminal or civil, which undergird the principles of law that are applicable 
to a particular case. . . . [B]y judicially noticing public policies or 
tendencies, judges become “an active participant . . . adopting law to a 
volatile socio-political environment.”215 
There is evidence in both the local history and in local law enforcement practices 
and policies of a cultural view of tolerance or indifference and perhaps even support 
for the form of prostitution presented by the facts of the Carroll v. Beardon case.  
Montana, like other rural Western states whose development had roots in male-
dominated occupations and industries, such as mining, agricultural work, the railroad 
industry, and the military, had a strong history of prostitution.216  This prostitution, 
though never legalized, was controlled and even contributed to the local economy.217  
Throughout Montana’s history can be found statements of support for houses of 
prostitution made by public officials.  For example in 1914, when the Custer County 
                                                          
located was only recently cleared of slums and the magnificent Coliseum erected.  Not 
far away, the new Lincoln Center development is being constructed.  A new opera 
house, a law school, the Philharmonic Society and other cultural and artistic endeavors 
will be housed there.  Landlord’s projected contribution here is and will be a welcome 
contribution to the people of the city and all its visitors.  In an ever expanding and 
kaleidoscopic change, social welfare and progress must take place.  In such an 
evolution certain private rights must be subordinated to the demands and needs of 
many. 
Hartford v. Regal Shoe Store No. 162, Inc., 192 N.Y.S.2d 167, 172 (NY. Mun. Ct. 1959).     
 
214
 For a discussion of the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, see 
Christopher Onstott, Judicial Notice and the Law’s “Scientific” Search for Truth, 40 AKRON 
L. REV. 465, 470 (2007).  Montana did not, however,  adopt the terms “adjudicative facts,” 
and “legislative facts,” finding this distinction confusing: 
The Commission rejects the approach under the Federal Rule 201 of limiting judicial 
notice to adjudicative facts because this is a basis which is totally new, not clearly 
defined, and contrary to existing Montana practice.  The confusion and litigation 
bound to result are clearly contrary to a rule which is meant to save time and expense. 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-10-201, Commission Comments.  For a discussion of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 201, see WEISSENBERGER’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 212, §§ 201.1-201.7.     
 
215
 Burton, 29 N.M. L. REV., supra note 211, at 314 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 
328 (4th ed. 1992)). 
 
216
 In early Western “mining camps women were a minority, and frequently the first and 
most numerous female migrants were prostitutes.”  MARY MURPHY, MINING CULTURES: MEN, 
WOMEN, AND LEISURE IN BUTTE, 1914-41, 77 (1997).  “Prostitutes probably made up the 
second largest group of gainfully employed women in the West” in the late nineteenth 
century.  Judith K. Cole, A Wide Field for Usefulness: Women's Civil Status and the Evolution 
of Women's Suffrage on the Montana Frontier, 1864-1914, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 262, 270 n. 
61 (1990).   
 
217
 See supra note 63.  The fines paid by prostitutes amounted to “no small portion of [a] 
city’s revenue.”  Larry V. Bishop, Law Enforcement in Custer County, Montana, 1893-1918, 
3:3 POLICE STUD: INT’L REV. POLICE DEV. 3, 8 (Fall 1980).   
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Law Enforcement League passed a resolution urging elimination of prostitution and 
gambling, “the Custer County Attorney argued that most people in the community 
favored the houses” of prostitution.218  Butte, Montana, the most infamous and 
enduring location of prostitution within the state of Montana, was described in a 
1953 article appearing in Esquire magazine, as “one of [the nation’s] ‘most wide-
open towns.’”219  The last house of prostitution located in Butte, Montana closed in 
1981, eighteen years after the Supreme Court of Montana issued its decision in 
Carroll v. Beardon, and after a very public battle in 1971 involving the closure of 
another house of prostitution and a statement made by the mayor of Butte, which 
was published in the Great Falls Tribune: “‘The people of Butte want prostitution . . 
. [and] at least we’re honest in Butte and admit we’ve got houses of prostitution.’”220  
As to local law enforcement practices, throughout the history of the nation law 
enforcement has been sporadic and costly, aimed mostly at other types of 
prostitution, such as street prostitution and, more recently, individuals who coerce 
women, and particularly minors, to engage in prostitution.221  Federal crime statistics 
                                                          
 
218
 Bishop, supra note 217, at 8.  The County Attorney also asserted “that by keeping the 
districts segregated it would be easier to control those that visited the area.”  Id.  Local reform 
movements failed and the houses of prostitution remained open.  Id. 
 
219
 Baumler, supra note 63, at 293 & n.26 (quoting Monroe Frye, The Three Last Wide-
Open Towns, ESQUIRE 47 (June 1953)).  A cab driver’s comments were included in a report 
issued in 1953 by the Montana Attorney General: 
With all the miners here in Butte and the soldiers we get from other towns, the guys 
have to have some way to blow off steam, so the cops let the line run. . . . The girls 
don’t bother anybody.  The line is in an alley and nobody has any business going in 
there unless he wants a girl. 
Id. at 293 & n.24 (quoting MONT. ATTORNEY GEN., REPORT ON PROSTITUTION (Feb. 1953)).  
The phrase, “wide open town,” refers to the fact that “a man could buy a drink, place a bet, or 
visit a prostitute at any hour of the day or night without worrying about being arrested.”  Mary 
Murphy, Bootlegging Mothers and Drinking Daughters: Gender and Prohibition in Butte, 
Montana, 46 (No. 2) AM. Q. 174, 177 (June, 1994).  Helena, Montana also had a strong 
history of tolerance and unofficial regulation of prostitution.   
 
220
 Baumler, supra note 63, at 294 (quoting MONTANA STANDARD (Butte) (Feb. 22, 1991)).  
See also MACAULAY, supra note 2, at 498; John Cloud, The Oldest Profession Gets a New 
Museum, TIME, Aug. 14, 2000, at 4.     
 
221
 “Street walking” or street prostitution has been “long viewed as the most disorderly and 
dangerous form of the trade.”  Nicole Stelle Garnett, Relocating Disorder, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1075, 1106 (2005).   
The criminal law is most frequently enforced against street prostitutes, the poorest and 
greatest minority of women who deal in sex work.  Since these women are the most 
visible prostitutes, they account for roughly ninety percent of all prostitution arrests. 
However, street prostitutes comprise only ten to twenty percent of all prostitutes in the 
U.S. 
Gregg Aronson, Note, Seeking a Consolidated Feminist Voice for Prostitution in the U.S., 3 
RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 377-78 (2006).  A few larger U.S. cities “have shifted their 
emphasis from the street to indoor prostitution, ostensibly going after the ‘big fish.’”  Ronald 
Weitzer, Prostitution Control in America: Rethinking Public Policy, 32 (No. 1) CRIME, L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 83, 90 (1999).  The United States Congress passed the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act in 2000, which was expanded in 2006 “to address abusive practices and the 
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indicate that there were 71,355 arrests for prostitution nationwide in 2009.222  Arrest 
patterns within Montana appear to support law enforcement tolerance of the kind of 
prostitution occurring at the Hillside Ranch.223  Such evidence would strengthen the 
cultural fact argument, as would evidence of legislative policies and legislative intent 
to focus efforts on eradicating other forms of prostitution.224  
Whether such evidence existed to the degree that it would have been sufficient to 
convince the trial court to take judicial notice of it is difficult to determine.  Had the 
Supreme Court of Montana taken this alternative route, it would have engaged in an 
intellectually honest approach to and resolution of the issues, and it would have 
                                                          
exploitation of minors in the U.S. prostitution industry.”  Moira Heiges, Note, From the Inside 
Out: Reforming State and Local Prostitution Enforcement to Combat Sex Trafficking in the 
United States and Abroad, 94 MINN. L. REV. 428, 429 (2009).  “Yet, while federal law now 
prioritizes protecting victims and deterring traffickers, state prostitution enforcement still 
indiscriminately targets persons in prostitution. . . .”  Id.    
 
222
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2009, Table 29, available at http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/data/table_29.html.  “The 
fiscal costs are substantial.  A study of the country’s sixteen largest cities found that they spent 
a total of $120 million in 1985 enforcing prostitution laws.”  Weitzer, supra note 221, at 83.  
Different reasons are advanced for prohibiting prostitution, including the following: 
[T]he Model Penal Code emphasizes disease prevention as the primary goal.  Other 
reasons have included suppressing the organized crime surrounding prostitution, 
protecting the integrity of the family, protecting nonparticipants from unwelcome 
solicitations, protecting prostitutes from physical abuse, and protecting minors who 
are coerced into a life of prostitution.  The criminalization of prostitution has become 
controversial in recent years, but the controversy appears not to have led to any 
changes in state law. 
POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 118, at 155. 
 
223
 Arrest data does not exist for the precise years surrounding the case because such 
records were not kept until 1974.  Data from 1974 forward, however, is available and was 
supplied by Jimmy Steyee, SAC Director/Statistician for the Montana Board of Crime Control 
via email at jstyee@mt.gov.  This data indicates that there were ten arrests in Montana in 1974 
for prostitution.  More current arrest data is available online and reveals two arrests for 
prostitution in Montana in 2000.  Arrests in 2000, Seventh Judicial District MT District Court, 
FEDSTATS (Oct. 5, 2011, 8:29 p.m.), available at 
http://www.fedstats.gov/mapstats/arrests/statecourt/ 271070.html.  More recent data from 
2009 reveals zero arrests for prostitution in Toole County, Montana.  MONT. BD. OF CRIME 
CONTROL, MONTANA-CRIMES REPORTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT, 2009, TOOLE COUNTY (Oct. 
5, 2011), available at http://www.mbcc.mt.gov/ CrimeReport/default.asp.    
 
224
 The comments accompanying the criminal laws passed in 1973 appear to indicate 
support for such legislative intent underlying the prostitution laws existing in 1963 and, 
therefore, applicable to the decision in the case.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-601, Criminal 
Law Commission Comments, indicating that  
prior law reflects the common-law concern for prostitution—i.e. the public nuisance 
aspects of open solicitation.  The requirement that the solicitation be public seems at 
odds with the modern conception that prostitution, discreetely or indiscreetly carried 
on, ought to be controlled.  Thus section 94-5-603(1)(a) now MCA 45-5-602(1)(a) 
reflects the position that professional prostitution is criminal even if carried on in 
private.  
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furthered the public interest in judicial integrity.225  By invoking cultural views via 
either the judicial notice doctrine or as a component of an alternative test to assess 
contract enforceability, the court would also demonstrate an interest in and respect 
for public opinion about positive law as the court grappled with this area of 
overlapping and intersecting criminal and civil laws aimed at regulating sexual 
behavior.  
Judicial recognition of cultural values in the public policy balance of interests 
would additionally move the analysis away from the “hyperindividualistic starting 
point—the ‘separation thesis’—that underlies modern American jurisprudence” in 
which 
[w]e imagine ourselves as disconnected self-sufficient beings; we believe 
that we are essentially and fundamentally free-floating independent 
selves.  Accordingly, we think that the greatest danger we face is that 
other individuals will interfere with or violate our otherwise blissfully 
isolated independence.  This “separation thesis” drives us to fortify 
ourselves with laws that preserve values like autonomy and privacy, while 
ignoring other values that are equally essential to human flourishing like . 
. . mutual responsibility.  Human beings are social animals, we are all 
inescapably interdependent, we are mutually bound, and we need one 
another.  Thus, . . . building and cultivating a “connection thesis” to 
counterbalance the prevailing separation bias is critical to creating a more 
humane jurisprudence.226 
It is particularly appropriate for a court to prioritize community cultural values in 
the public policy balance given the fact that laws related to sex crimes vary 
significantly in the United States such that “by crossing a state boundary one may be 
stepping into a different moral universe.”227  Had the court engaged in such analysis 
this 1963 decision could have been relevant to contemporary courts and legislatures 
as they continue to struggle with similar issues.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Montana’s, three-page opinion in Carroll v. Beardon is a 
treasure for those who teach first-year law students.  Its deceptive simplicity is a 
lesson in close reading.  It provides scholars and teachers endless opportunities to 
explore the cultural context within which courts operate and construct case 
narratives.  Its humorous tone additionally belies a serious failure by the court to 
provide a fair and impartial resolution of the parties’ dispute and to create useful 
precedent for future courts and litigants.  The decision and its implications remain 
relevant and merit consideration by scholars exploring the intersection of contract 
                                                          
 
225
 See Burton, 41 IDAHO L. REV., supra note 211, at 91.  Burton asserts that the purposes 
served by the judicial notice doctrine are “judicial economy,” “intellectual honesty,” and 
“scientific accuracy.”  Id.   
 
226
 Shari Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647, 658-59 (2011) (discussing the legal 
treatment of unmarried sexual partners who conceive a child together).  See also Shari Motro, 
The Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV.  917, 941-42 (2010) (discussing the legal treatment 
of unmarried sexual partners who conceive a child together).   
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 POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 118, at 2.  See also supra note 133. 
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and criminal laws related to intimate sexual relationships, particularly in the context 
of the public policy defense to contract enforcement. 
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